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ABSTRACT 
 The existing methodologies used by law enforcement to manage crowd events to 
ensure public safety do not adequately address current protester-on-protester violence. 
Outdated methodologies, based on classical crowd psychology, may increase the chances 
of violence between crowd groups. Case study analysis using soccer hooliganism as a 
proxy for intergroup protest violence demonstrates the relevance of modern crowd 
psychology in this new protest paradigm. This thesis finds that law enforcement could 
effectively use social identity theory to understand differing groups’ needs and reduce 
protester-on-protester violence. 
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This thesis explores the question of how to address a new violent crowd event 
paradigm to ensure public safety. Continued intergroup violence at crowd events not only 
jeopardizes public safety but also undermines core expectations of democratic values in a 
civil society. An analysis of crowd control theory and methodologies used to address soccer 
hooliganism as a proxy for political protest intergroup violence shows how modern crowd 
psychology theory offers insight and the means to engage crowd protest groups proactively 
to reduce violence, thereby ensuring a civil society. This research examines three case 
studies in which a crowd event had the potential to devolve into intergroup violence. 
Analysis of each event was derived from either after-action reports, news reporting, 
scholarly journal articles, or a combination thereof. Each case study examined, in relation 
to specific components of modern crowd psychology, components of social identity theory 
(SIT) and the elaborated social identity model (ESIM) as a framework for comparative 
analysis. The findings from this analysis show that applying modern crowd theory to crowd 
control methodologies can mitigate group violence. 
The use of SIT and ESIM provides law enforcement a more dynamic, proactive 
relationship with crowd groups. Understanding group identity through the lens of SIT 
provides a strategic awareness based on specific analytical markers.1 ESIM builds upon 
this awareness to understand how group identity may change based on external influences 
and the changing perceptions of legitimacy.2 The context gained through group identity 
analysis affords the opportunity for communication and responsiveness between law 
enforcement and crowd groups. This dynamic relationship could mitigate violent 
intergroup tendencies. 
 
1 David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism 
Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 67. 
2 Clifford Stott and Stephen Reicher, “How Conflict Escalates: The Inter-Group Dynamics of 
Collective Football Crowd ‘Violence,’” Sociology 32, no. 2 (May 1998): 363–64, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
0038038598032002007. 
xiv 
SIT and ESIM directly correlate with crowd control methodologies in practical 
ways. Research into soccer hooliganism as a proxy for political protest, as well as 
comparative case study analysis, illustrates that specific crowd control methodologies are 
effective at enhancing legitimacy. Intelligence analysis and outreach in advance of events 
build relationships between law enforcement and anticipated crowd groups. The use of 
specific officers as liaisons before, during, and after events enhances communication and 
might prevent misunderstandings that shift group identities. Finally, scaling police tactics 
to meet group identity and posture could foster legitimacy between all groups. A concerted 
effort by all groups to communicate their needs and intentions, coupled with actions that 
convey legitimacy to all, could avert circumstances that might alter the identities of those 
more prone to violence. 
The modern lens of SIT and ESIM fosters a greater awareness of group identity and 
a crowd-control posture intent on intergroup violence prevention. The assurance of public 
safety at political protests helps create the conditions for a civil society. 
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I. PROTEST VIOLENCE: A NEW FORM OF 
THE “ENGLISH DISEASE”? 
A rally in Oregon sponsored by the right-wing group Patriot Prayer turned 
violent on Saturday as demonstrators clashed with anti-fascist protesters, 
who showed up in opposition to the event. . . . More than 100 demonstrators 
attended the event in support of Patriot Prayer, while more than 100 
counterprotesters . . . threw eggs, half-empty water bottles and firecrackers 
at demonstrators shortly after the march by right-wingers began. 
 —Carla Herreria, Huffington Post1 
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
Today’s law enforcement agencies face a new challenge in their ability to manage 
crowd behavior and ensure public safety. Violence between protest groups has increased 
over the past three years, with the threat to local communities rising accordingly.2 Conflict 
and violence between protesters and law enforcement are often studied, yet protester-on-
protester violence receives little attention. This thesis analyzes a separate crowd behavior 
paradigm in which research on intergroup behavior has identified successful 
methodologies for law enforcement crowd management. A comparative analysis of law 
enforcement methodologies highlights how efforts in the United Kingdom and Europe to 
address soccer hooliganism can inform policies to benefit American law enforcement 
agencies in their efforts to address growing political protest violence.3 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Violence at political protests is now a real threat in the United States. During the 
2016 U.S. presidential election, the national discussion over the competing campaigns of 
 
1 Carla Herreria, “Right-Wing Portland Rally Declared Riot amid Clashes with Antifa Protesters,” 
Huffington Post, July 1, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/patriot-prayer-portland-riot_us_ 
5b383170e4b0f3c221a17a8f. 
2 Colin Dwyer, “As U.S. Copes with Charlottesville Violence, Protesters Take to the Streets,” NPR, 
August 13, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/13/543259431/as-u-s-copes-with-
charlottesville-violence-protesters-take-to-the-streets. 
3 While the term football is more accepted in the United Kingdom and Europe, where football 
hooliganism was first identified and researched, this thesis instead uses the American term, soccer. 
2 
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton exacerbated an already evident political and social 
divide. In the weeks between the election of President Trump and his inauguration, 
elements of the national discussion evolved into public protests.4 Local communities 
throughout the United States experienced these protests, some of which turned violent.5 In 
certain communities, the recurrence of protests and counter-protests spawned by the 
rhetoric of President Trump continue three years after his election. Violence among 
protesters is now more evident across the country.6 Of specific concern are the repeated 
confrontations between right-wing conservative and anti-fascist groups.7 Protest violence 
has a long tradition in U.S. history. Previous crowd control methodologies have addressed 
all participating groups as one, thereby creating a dynamic of protester versus law 
enforcement that differs from today’s crowd management challenge. The stated intent of 
current protest groups opposing one another is to voice their objections publicly, yet the 
resulting intimidation and, at times, violence between right-wing conservative and anti-
fascist protest groups leave city leadership and public safety responders at a loss to solve 
the liberty-versus-security dilemma and effectively protect the community.8  
In light of this trend, local governments face the challenge of ensuring both public 
safety and First Amendment rights in the face of antagonistic, and sometimes violent, 
protest/counter-protest events. Conflicting protest groups and the public often 
misunderstand local government efforts to achieve safe, open protest environments and 
object to the efforts as violations of civil societal norms or outright favoritism of one protest 
 
4 Jonathan Landay and Scott Malone, “Violence Flares in Washington during Trump Inauguration,” 
Reuters, January 19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-inauguration-protests-
idUSKBN1540J7. 
5 Niraj Chokshi, “Assaults Increased when Cities Hosted Trump Rallies, Study Finds,” New York 
Times, March 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/us/trump-rally-violence.html. 
6 Avi Selk, “Political Violence Goes Coast to Coast as Proud Boys and Antifa Activists Clash in New 
York, Portland,” Washington Post, October 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/10/14/ 
political-violence-goes-coast-coast-proud-boys-antifa-activists-clash-new-york-portland/. 
7 Gillian Flaccus, “Violent Protests Again Draw Attention to Portland, Oregon,” Seattle Times, June 9, 
2018, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/violent-protests-again-draw-attention-to-portland-
oregon/. 
8 Leah Sottile, “Protests Again Convulse Portland, Ore., as Groups on the Right and Left Face Off,” 




group over the other. This dilemma places law enforcement in the difficult position of 
having to ensure civil liberties and public safety while attempting to satisfy opposing crowd 
groups. 
Communities have struggled to implement crowd management tactics that ensure 
public safety while providing free-speech opportunities for all ideologies. After the 1960s, 
the roles of protesters and law enforcement in political protests were static, with each side 
seeing the other as a threat.9 These roles changed over the next few decades as the 
transnational threats of drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and organized crime began to 
affect local communities.10 The 1981 Cooperation Act allowed American law enforcement 
to address these new threats by emulating the U.S. military, thereby developing a more 
aggressive, paramilitary approach.11 The application of this new approach eventually 
extended to crowd management events, thus conflating political activism with a security 
threat.12 This new paramilitary approach has altered the previous institutionalized law 
enforcement crowd-control response from decades earlier and created a contentious protest 
environment where the expression of civil liberties becomes a challenge.  
In sum, community civic leaders are caught between abiding by federal law—while 
working to maintain the safety of the public and protesters—and answering to public 
scrutiny. Past crowd management methodologies are insufficient for maintaining public 
safety. Instead, law enforcement should work to understand the individual protest group 
ideologies and develop legitimacy among all crowd groups to provide safe opportunities 
for free speech. This thesis examines the challenge of conflicting protest groups—
specifically those between right-wing conservative and anti-fascist groups—and applies 
social identity theory (SIT) analysis to identify ideas for enhanced public safety planning. 
 
9 John D. McCarthy and Clark McPhail, “The Institutionalization of Protests in the United States,” in 
The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century, ed. David S. Meyer and Sidney 
Tarrow (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 84–85. 
10 Stephen Hill and Randall Beger, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut,” Social Justice 36, no. 1 
(2009): 27–28. 
11 Hill and Beger, 29. 
12 Hill and Beger, 31. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can social identity theory explain protester-on-protester violence and assist 
with better public safety planning? 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research on protest violence fills volumes. The history of protest violence within 
the United States is vast enough to consider its nature, issues, and dynamics without even 
examining its history around the world. Based on historical significance, prior research and 
discussion centers almost exclusively on the conflict between protesters and law 
enforcement. But violence between protester groups is a subtler variant of protest violence 
without significant research. This thesis examines intergroup violence within the soccer 
hooliganism paradigm, evident in many countries outside the United States, as a proxy for 
understanding intergroup U.S. protest violence. 
Soccer hooliganism, as opposed to other intergroup dynamics, may seem dissimilar 
to protest violence. A study of gang culture and group dynamics or the conflict inherent in 
nation-state armies may seem more appropriate. However, neither of these dynamics 
embody a choice in group identification free of commitment or obligation, which is 
inherent to those participating in intergroup violence associated with soccer club rivalries. 
In addition, group identification in gangs or nation-state armies is associated with financial 
gain for the individual, which is not the case for soccer hooligans. As is the case for 
participants in violent political protests, soccer fans have neither financial gain nor legal or 
coerced commitment. For this reason, this thesis examines soccer hooliganism as a proxy 
for political protests to understand the application of crowd psychology theory to 
intergroup protest violence. 
Although crowd psychology is time-tested research, current theories run counter to 
historical understandings of crowd behavior. This thesis discusses two specific theories 
that provide a modern understanding of crowd group behavior. These theories articulate 
differences in group dynamics that relate to both crowd intention and evolving behaviors. 
This insight reveals opportunities for law enforcement to apply methodologies that could 
prevent or minimize the chance of intergroup violence. 
5 
The translation of current crowd behavior theory from soccer hooliganism to 
political protest becomes evident when considering specific events. Comparative analysis 
allows for the understanding of similarities and differences between events that provide 
insight for new practical applications. This thesis uses case study analysis across paradigms 
and crowd psychology theories to establish the relevancy of soccer hooliganism to political 
protest as well as the applicability of current crowd theories. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides a review of relevant literature on general theory, covering the 
subjects of civil society, political protests, and SIT. It explores relevant background 
information, which leads to a more in-depth discussion in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter III examines SIT and crowd management. As soccer hooliganism is the 
proxy for understanding these concepts, the chapter begins by examining the use of sport 
to understand society. Soccer hooliganism is then described within the context of general 
soccer violence. SIT is then outlined within the context of soccer hooliganism, including 
an examination of analytical markers. The elaborated social identity model (ESIM) is 
introduced as a mechanism for understanding the evolution of group identity in relation to 
external influences. The chapter concludes by drawing an analogy between soccer 
hooliganism and intergroup violence at political protests. 
Chapter IV comparatively examines three separate case studies of crowd behavior, 
the application of law enforcement crowd-control methodologies, and their subsequent 
outcomes. Specifically, the cases include the 2004 Union of European Football 
Associations Tournament; the 2007 Free Speech Rally in Portland, Oregon; and the 2017 
Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. These case studies cross paradigms, 
apply different theories of crowd psychology in their understanding of crowd behavior, and 
implement different crowd control tactics based on their understandings. 
  
6 
Chapter V concludes this thesis by providing analysis and findings on the use of 
SIT to understand crowd intergroup dynamics for ensuring public safety. The chapter 
makes recommendations for the application of SIT and ESIM at crowd events—drawn 
from the soccer hooliganism paradigm—that could reduce intergroup violence at political 
protests in the United States. 
7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A civil society is a society of civility in the conduct of the members of the 
society towards each other. Civility enters into conduct between individuals 
and between individuals towards society. It likewise regulates the relations 
of collectivities towards each other, the relations between collectivities and 
the state and the relations of individuals with the state. 
 ——Edward Shils13 
This literature review analyzes scholarly and public policy works related to crowd 
psychology, crowd management, and public safety. It examines the academic debates 
surrounding a civil society’s role in a democracy, policing and protest, and finally SIT on 
crowd psychology and soccer hooliganism. 
A. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN A DEMOCRACY 
This body of literature, including the works of prominent scholars like Linz and 
Stepan as well as Walzer, argues that the civility of society is the hallmark of democracy. 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan have examined the development of the broad definition of 
democracy in countries transitioning from non-democratic regimes.14 The authors believe 
a new democracy reaches democratic consolidation when, among other things, it achieves 
the constitutional dimension of resolving political conflicts through established norms, at 
which point resolution outside such norms is unproductive and expensive.15 Such a 
consolidated democratic government must provide its citizenry conditions for “the 
development of a free and lively civil society . . . [and] a rule of law to ensure legal 
guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life.”16 Linz and Stepan 
posit that without achieving a level of democratic consolidation where such conditions can 
be met, societies are not inherently civil, and the opportunity for repressing protest groups 
 
13 Edward Shils, “The Virtue of a Civil Society,” in The Civil Society Reader, ed. Virginia A. 
Hodgkinson and Michael W. Foley (Hanover, NH: Tufts University Press, 2003), 292, ProQuest. 
14 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Community Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
15 Linz and Stepan, 5. 
16 Linz and Stepan, 7. 
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exists.17 This observation is an important reminder for local communities that struggle to 
provide for free-speech opportunities while containing violent protester conflicts. 
Theorists disagree about the requirements for a good life, but Michael Walzer 
supports democratic consolidation, arguing that the formation of small groups of people 
and their collective organizing efforts toward the good of society creates a civil 
democracy.18 The author initiates his discussion by examining four perspectives—from 
democratic to republican states, from market-centric to nationalistic outlooks—on the 
question of what setting is best for a good life. After examining answers to this question, 
Walzer’s work culminates in the idea that “the good life can only be lived in a civil society, 
the realm of fragmentation and struggle but also of concrete and authentic solidarities.”19 
Walzer posits that a singular focus on any of these four separate perspectives is discredited 
because of its narrow view: “Civil society is a setting of settings: all are included, none is 
preferred.”20 In this broader view, where perspectives overlap, he argues that a democratic 
state and civil society coexist in support of one another.21 When narrower perspectives are 
inflexible with competing beliefs, the civility of democratic society becomes lost. 
Lucan Way agrees with Walzer to a point but finds democracy threatened when 
such small groups emerge without strong national institutions. Similar to Walzer, Way 
envisions civil society as a “network of voluntary and autonomous organizations and 
institutions that exist outside the state, market, and family, and which are difficult for state 
leaders to control or eliminate.”22 Within the context of the 2013–2014 EuroMaidan 
uprising in Ukraine, Way describes how the strength of this protest effort was the civil 
society created within it: multiple small groups, working together toward a better protest 
 
17 Linz and Stepan, 17. 
18 Michael Walzer, “A Better Vision: The Idea of Civil Society,” in The Civil Society Reader, ed. 
Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Michael W. Foley (Hanover, NH: Tufts University Press, 2003), 317, 
ProQuest. 
19 Walzer, 314. 
20 Walzer, 311. 
21 Walzer, 316–17. 
22 Lucan Way, “Civil Society and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 3 (2014): 36, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2014.0042. 
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and ultimately a better Ukraine.23 The author describes how the EuroMaidan protest was 
seen not as the collective view of the entire country but as the efforts of specific political 
and social movements.24 Like Walzer, Way attributes the success of the EuroMaidan 
protest to small groups, each with its own perspective on a new way forward for the 
Ukrainian people, together capturing the multifaceted nature of the desired democracy.25 
The author asserts that not all protests are successful when small groups unite toward a 
common goal, citing earlier protests in Ukraine and others in Cameroon, but in the 
EuroMaidan case, it succeeded.26 Violence attributed to civil societies, such as violent 
episodes that occurred during the EuroMaidan movement, can undermine a movement’s 
overall intent and vision.27 As Way describes, the idea of civil society both applies around 
the world toward creating better communities and acts as a cautionary tale to avoid violence 
for fear of losing that vision. Small protest groups may or may not represent the views of 
the greater society, but their actions are critical to the viability of their message. 
Dorata Pietrzyk examines the idea of civil society within new democracies, 
specifically in East-Central Europe. Agreeing with Way, Pietrzyk claims that in efforts to 
establish democracies after totalitarian regimes, East-Central European communities 
identified the goal of civil society as one that required civic engagement, separate from the 
state, with the intent of convincing the state of its opinion.28 The author argues that such 
action ensures an enduring democratic state institution.29 Pietrzyk expands on the concept 
of civil society, clarifying that not all organized community groups oppose the state or want 
solely to impose their views; rather, such groups may support the state and its market 
economy.30 The author suggests that an equitable dynamic between an effective 
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government, a functioning market, and a civil society is essential for creating 
democracies.31 Although the democratic history of these countries is still in its infancy, 
their struggles to attain or retain democracy are stark reminders for the United States during 
times of political and social discontent. 
In contrast to Walzer, Way, and Pietrzyk, Craig Calhoun articulates how civil 
societies can be the result of nation-states as well as democratic ideals.32 In this context, 
Calhoun argues that nationalistic feelings are just as important to civil societies as 
democratic ideals are, except that the former is devoted to the state whereas the latter 
concerns democratic institutional values.33 Calhoun acknowledges how popular views see 
nationalism as opposed to civil societies through narrow-minded attitudes and some 
instances of evil tendencies.34 The author posits that such nationalism is necessary in 
certain circumstances for the benefit of society.35 He emphasizes this point by describing 
how nationalism provides local communities and global partners a method for forming 
partnerships and allows a nation’s communities to commit to supporting public institutions 
and projects that benefit the whole.36 The author questions the moral virtues of certain 
nationalist viewpoints, but based on the lack of other realistic alternatives, there is a “need 
to see the mutual relationship that has tied nationalism to democracy throughout the 
modern era.”37 Calhoun concludes that successful modern democracies must remember 
their success was a result of historical nationalism.38 Nationalistic protest voices may not 
be socially acceptable to some, but one must recognize their place in society and allow 
them an opportunity to speak. 
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The theoretical discussion of civil society is often detached from the practice of 
democracy. Neera Chandhoke examines civil society theory but, like Calhoun, refuses to 
hold it as an easily attainable democratic ideal.39 The author acknowledges that civil society 
is necessary in formal democracies, critical to social and political organizations, but only 
indirectly responsible for demonstrations of such ideals as activism and protest.40 Instead, 
Chandhoke agrees with Linz and Stepan as well as Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato that civil 
society is one element of society, distinct from the state and its economy.41 Separate from 
these two elements, civil society is composed of plurality, privacy, publicity, and legality.42 
These characteristics, she writes, differentiate civil society from the state and the economy 
but also establish it as a normative ideal.43 While the theory of civil society might then be 
an ideal, Chandhoke concludes that the existence of civil society is more problematic and 
difficult.44 The democratic ideal of protest and free speech are inherent to American 
culture, but providing opportunities for each can be challenging. 
In summary, this body of literature helps define the parameters within which a 
democratic civil society can exist and for what purpose. Conversely, the literature also 
alludes to how civil society can be lost. 
B. FREE SPEECH AND POLICING 
A separate body of literature argues that protests in the United States are the 
application of free speech and their protection is the responsibility of local police forces. 
After the Revolutionary War, the authors of the U.S. Constitution demonstrated the 
importance of public dissent by ensuring this right as the First Amendment in the Bill of 
Rights: 
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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances.45 
The U.S. government considers the protection of this constitutional right to be, in part, the 
responsibility of local law enforcement.46 Local governments, such as the city of Portland, 
Oregon, agree by including a commitment to support the U.S Constitution as part of the 
oath of office taken by their police officers.47  
Police officers swear to protect the constitutional rights of their communities. Yet 
Jerome H. Skolnick suggests this might not be the best method. He notes that adhering to 
the protection of constitutional rights is not intrinsic to law enforcement practices.48 
Skolnick further stresses that the evolution of policing and police reform in the United 
States has shifted the approach of law enforcement from outright personally abusive tactics 
to those more aligned with the rule of law yet still subversive in their violation of a person’s 
constitutional rights.49 Although police reform continues to recruit those who will abide by 
the rule of law as a means of meeting the expectation of offering constitutional protections 
to local communities, Skolnick argues that the dichotomy between operational policies and 
their legality makes law enforcement incapable of fulfilling the ideal of protecting the 
citizens’ constitutional rights.50 While local law enforcement continues to work toward 
such protections, citizens expect their rights to be upheld, as described by the Constitution, 
when they choose to demonstrate these rights through protest. 
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Other literature discusses the effects of public protests and police responses on the 
democratic process. Robin Lipp, for one, examines the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) as a case study for protest management and public safety, noting the largest 
American city “is . . . of symbolic importance for protesters . . . and a city whose policy 
choices bear on the overall climate for dissent in the United States.”51 The author finds 
public protest a benefit to and of democracy. As an equal opportunity to speak out, public 
protest grants a means of discovering the democratic process and an opportunity that can 
spur others in a call to action.52 In the context of historical protest policing, Lipp highlights 
how the democratic and cultural value of protests to society has been lost in police 
department–led decision making.53 The author examines two New York City protest events 
and the NYPD’s command-and-control tactics to enforce a “zero tolerance” approach to 
maintaining order.54 NYPD crowd management tactics espoused at the time targeted minor 
crimes, such as property damage, to prevent an escalation to more unruly behavior, a policy 
known as the “broken windows” approach.55 While acknowledging the potential harm of 
protests to host communities, Lipp finds that overly restrictive police efforts to maintain 
control and ensure public safety may explicitly contradict the notion of democracy.56 The 
legal precedent and ability to espouse an opinion in public can be easily undercut by crowd 
control tactics implemented to safeguard this right.  
Several scholars believe the ongoing militarization of police forces signifies an end 
to civil society. Stephen Hill and Randall Beger echo Lipp’s view by focusing on how the 
militarization of police forces fails to promote a democratic society.57 The authors contend 
this process of militarization violates the norms of democratic policing that prioritize the 
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needs of citizens, hold police accountable to the law, and expect transparent action.58 
Additionally, Hill and Beger cite how the militarization of policing violates the norm of 
human rights, especially free speech and the right to protest, which corresponds with Lipp’s 
ideas. An analysis of the European Gendarmerie Force—a paramilitary police force 
deployed to manage crises yet granted immunity from criminal prosecution for tactics used 
in the completion of its mission—certainly validates the scholars’ concerns.59 Achieving 
full police militarization may be the tipping point at which all expected norms of 
democratic policing are lost. 
Another body of literature analyzes how the police response to public protests has 
evolved while public protests have virtually remained unchanged.60 Regarding this 
connection, Charlotte Guerra examines a shift in policing, from safeguarding civil liberties 
to developing warrior mentality, in the shadow of the 1999 World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Conference in Seattle, Washington.61 Guerra indicates that the Seattle Police 
Department’s response to demonstrations surrounding the WTO Conference escalated 
from crowd control and management to special weapons and tactics raids, city emergency 
orders, and the deployment of the National Guard in response to 40,000 protesters.62 The 
author argues that when a police response displays a posture of confrontation with the 
protesters, it reflects the department’s intent to curtail free speech rather than protect the 
ability to speak freely.63 The author emphasizes protests are a “right of the masses to speak 
in a public format to express their dissatisfaction[,] . . . a critical liberty that requires 
safeguarding. It is a staple of our nation’s political process, and a right rooted in the very 
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start of our nation.”64 Guerra further warns that protests encumbered by restrictions or 
opposition will persist and evolve until their voices are heard.65  
The recent persistence and evolution of politically oriented protests in the United 
States have elevated the concerns of public safety agencies, thereby enhancing their 
response to maintain public safety. Hill and Beger agree with Guerra, citing the American 
Civil Liberties Union report documenting the Seattle Police Department’s tactics during 
the 1999 WTO protests that systematically stopped all organized protests.66 Such team 
tactics, including those that violate search and seizure rights, are antithetical to civil 
society, contend the authors, and far exceed any reasonable norm for ensuring public safety 
and protecting free speech during protests.67 Local governments and their law enforcement 
officers should be aware of how aggressive police crowd control tactics can both inflame 
crowd actions and signal problems within the implicit norms of civil society.  
Finally, an examination of protests is not complete without looking at the protesters. 
Hannah Arendt has articulated ideas of disobedience in civil society, separating 
conscientious objectors from civil protesters.68 The author finds the latter can only exist as 
a member of a larger group while the former can object as individuals, separate from 
others.69 The objection by a group warrants the term “civil disobedience,” finds Arendt, as 
opposed to a single person ignoring a traffic law, for example, which rarely sends a 
message to society.70 The author expands on this idea: 
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Civil disobedience arises when a significant number of citizens have 
become convinced either that the normal channels of change no longer 
function, and grievances will not be heard or acted upon, or that . . . the 
government is about to change and has embarked upon . . . modes of action 
whose legality and constitutionality are open to grave doubt.71 
Arendt argues such disobedience is not criminal, as it occurs in the open and not in a 
clandestine manner, nor does it take exception for itself.72 She finds the use of violence a 
distinguishing factor between a civil disobedient and a rebel, as the former recognizes the 
authority of a government and its laws.73 Therefore, discrediting or defining legal protest 
events as acts of civil disobedience merely on the basis of being criminal or rebellious fails 
to acknowledge the moral distinction between the two. 
In sum, this section has highlighted how civil disobedience and the shift toward 
aggressive protest management tactics by police can infringe on the democratic norms of 
civil society. The goal of ensuring public safety at protests extends not only to the public 
but also to officer safety, which Guerra and Lipp acknowledge is part of law enforcement’s 
reasoning in the shift to more aggressive police tactics. However, viable alternative 
methods do exist that achieve the safety of both the public and law enforcement by ensuring 
a civil society. 
C. CROWD PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCCER HOOLIGANISM 
This body of literature examines the psychology of crowd formation and action. 
Gustave Le Bon’s seminal work on crowd psychology posits that an organized group of 
people loses individuality in favor of a collective consciousness.74 Le Bon likens a mass of 
people to a single living form, an amalgamation of people like cells in the body with 
collective characteristics that display the psychological law of mental unity.75 The author 
cites three causes of organized crowd characteristics. First, an individual joining a crowd 
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feels a sense of power that would otherwise be restrained when on one’s own.76 Second, 
the feeling and behavior of a crowd are contagious to the extent that the individual 
sacrifices his singular interest for the joint interest.77 And third, crowd characteristics can 
be quite different from those of the individuals who make up the group.78 Le Bon describes 
these three forming characteristics to emphasize the individual who assimilates into a 
crowd. Yet, while Le Bon finds the act of joining a crowd diminishes an individual, he 
notes the collective crowd may act better or worse than its individuals, depending on its 
influences.79 This classic work in group identity provides a basis for later theories of crowd 
psychology. 
While identity theories explain how crowd groups behave, SIT provides a specific 
understanding of group identity, which helps achieve public safety. Michael Hogg, 
Deborah Terry, and Katherine White compare two psychological theories applicable to the 
understanding of crowd behavior—identity theory and SIT—both of which examine the 
relationship between the individual self and society.80 Identity theory, explain the authors, 
describes how society influences one’s behaviors while SIT instead finds group dynamics 
are the influencing factor.81 Despite both theories offering insight into how individuals 
define themselves, the authors pinpoint significant differences.82 Identity theory focuses 
on an individual’s roles and corresponding behaviors within society whereas SIT focuses 
on the group dynamic and an individual’s behaviors within the groups.83 The authors cite 
recent developments in self-categorization that advance SIT beyond identity theory in 
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explaining how intergroup development can define the self.84 Finally, according to Hogg, 
Terry, and White, the ideas of an individual in society, as described by identity theory, are 
different from his membership in a group, as articulated by SIT.85 Analysis of crowd 
behavior within the context of ensuring public safety could benefit from the context 
provided by SIT. 
SIT could offer a significant benefit to law enforcement and their goal of public 
safety while managing crowd events. Building on work by Henri Tajfel and John Turner, 
Stephen Reicher advanced SIT when describing group behavior in his examination of the 
precipitating events of the 1980 St. Paul’s Riot in Bristol, England.86 Reicher found Le 
Bon’s ideas lacking consideration of social influences in group behaviors.87 Instead, 
Reicher categorized the geographic identity, group relation to local law enforcement, and 
questions of group legitimacy as social factors that dictated the actions of the crowd 
participants before the violence.88 Reicher’s message—that “not only is crowd behaviour 
moulded by social identity but conversely, crowd behaviour may mould social identity” 
(original spelling)—altered the understanding and implications of crowd behavior.89 This 
change in perspective is still not understood completely by law enforcement nor totally 
evident in crowd management methodologies. 
Stephen Reicher further developed his ideas of SIT by applying the theory to crowd 
control methodologies used by law enforcement. In accordance with studies by Clifford 
Stott and John Drury et al., Reicher et al. posit that a singular perspective on crowd 
behavior can mislead management efforts while also miss an opportunity to advance new 
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approaches for interacting with the crowd in a manner that supports civil rights.90 Instead, 
Reicher et al. suggest that law enforcement tasked with providing safety and security 
measures for crowd events work to understand the different group identities that constitute 
the collective crowd to provide equal priority to all crowd groups.91 The authors argue that 
the classical approach to crowd psychology overlooks the dynamics of different groups 
within a crowd and limits law enforcement’s understanding and ability to respond 
proactively.92 Observing a crowd within the SIT paradigm allows for an understanding that 
multiple psychological groups can exist within a crowd and has great practicality for 
maintaining order, the authors write.93 By applying SIT to crowd management, Reicher et 
al. find three positive effects: (1) the ability to understand and interact with specific crowd 
groups can promote trust between law enforcement and the crowd; (2) the response to law 
enforcement by the crowd can be directly attributed to the ability of law enforcement to 
understand and interact with specific agitators within a crowd; and (3) different crowd 
groups can police themselves to maintain order, thereby aiding police in maintaining order 
and allowing for greater event legitimacy.94 The benefits of SIT have real-world 
application for law enforcement crowd-management tactics. 
Research finds SIT valid beyond its application at crowd events. Anders Strindberg 
and Mats Wärn articulate the significance of SIT and its application to understanding 
intergroup dynamics within global terrorist groups.95 Although an analogy between 
terrorists and protesters might be overblown for some, the authors stress their 
accompanying framework is an analysis of group identity and intergroup dynamics to 
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understand conflict.96 Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg build on these ideas, advocating for 
SIT because understanding an individual’s perspective in group relations “allows the 
researcher to account for her or his own hermeneutic biases as well as those of the research 
subject.”97 Understanding an individual’s perspective in relation to group dynamics 
without bias is crucial for accurate social analysis, argue the authors.98 Schwartz, Dunkel, 
and Waterman concur with the previous authors and build on the argument to include how 
intergroup dynamics lead ingroups to draw such strict lines that perceived inferiority 
differences “dehumanize” the outgroup.99 The application of SIT is not limited to crowd 
psychology; scholars have found it applicable in other disciplines. 
Scholars argue that the natural tendency toward social categorization among 
multiple groups has both positive and negative effects. Fathali M. Moghaddam discusses 
how the social categorization of individuals within a group is a predisposition of humans 
and evident from childhood to adulthood.100 The author stresses the importance of 
considering social stimuli in group identification as a means of understanding the vast 
number of influences that individuals encounter.101 Because of these influences, as 
Moghaddam discusses, individuals may self-categorize with a number of groups, based on 
group and cultural factors.102 The author cites Marilynn Brewer in understanding how 
multiple group identities are a means of reducing group bias.103 The fact that individuals 
may identify with several groups is relevant to changing crowd group affiliations and the 
evolution of group actions. 
 
96 Strindberg and Wärn, 65. 
97 David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, and N. T. Anders Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists’: Towards 
an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 24, no. 1 (2001): 5, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100118602. 
98 Brannan, Esler, and Anders Strindberg, 5. 
99 Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity Theory 
Perspective,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 6 ( 2009): 542, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
10576100902888453. 
100 Fathali M. Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for 
Democracy in Global Context (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2008), 31. 
101 Moghaddam, 32. 
102 Moghaddam, 32. 
103 Moghaddam, 32. 
21 
A group’s identity can change when it is challenged by other groups that are viewed 
as dominant. Jim Berger affirms that social identity provides insight into adversarial groups 
but focuses solely on the ingroup “legitimacy” that defines how a “collective identity group 
may rightfully be defined, maintained, and/or protected.”104 Berger emphasizes the 
possibility of instability in groups that align their social identities with ideas of nation, race, 
or religion as their identity is closely tied with legitimacy.105 A cultural understanding 
rooted in SIT can provide more accurate insight into group dynamics, which is not 
achievable with more subjective methodologies. 
Research on SIT has proven insightful within the soccer hooliganism paradigm. 
Clifford Stott and Geoff Pearson find that despite violence being associated with soccer 
since its inception, the term “soccer hooligan” is a media creation, without a specific 
definition, describing violence associated with the game since the 1960s.106 The authors 
acknowledge previous research into soccer hooliganism in the United Kingdom considered 
social influences but in a limited way, which prevented a full grasp of the social issues that 
influenced group behavior.107 Stott built on Reicher’s explanation of crowd behavior to 
understand the evolution of protest crowd behavior to violent actions.108 Stott and Pearson 
articulate the validity of applying SIT to describe the evolution of soccer hooliganism as a 
crowd behavior, akin to other violent crowd events but not an isolated issue of social 
violence.109 Stott and Pearson’s work sheds light on how social influences explain crowd 
violence, not only within the soccer hooliganism paradigm but also in all crowds presenting 
intergroup violence.  
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The point at which crowd violence may occur is important for law enforcement in 
ensuring public safety. Stott and Reicher expand the understanding of crowd conflict 
through SIT analysis of soccer hooliganism violence, positing that outgroup violence is 
more likely to result from ingroup actions than from a tendency toward violence by the 
outgroup.110 In this sense, Stott and Reicher align with Hill, Beger, and Guerra, citing how 
police tactics for crowd control can incite violence from a crowd that sees its legitimate 
rights being infringed upon.111 The authors articulate this idea in light of the perception of 
aggressive police tactics as standard and indiscriminate; the resulting outgroup response 
may be rooted in a desire for self-protection and as a means of limiting the use of violence 
by the ingroup.112 Although coinciding with Stott and Reicher’s analysis, Anthony King 
arrived at his conclusions differently.113 The author concludes that a lack of objective 
norms and rules predispose ingroup/outgroup dynamics to violence through a form of 
Waddington’s flashpoint model.114 Considering historical context—the psychological 
progression of crowds from calm to united and inflamed—King cites Waddington’s theory 
in his opinion that violence related to soccer groups is not inevitable but based on group 
dynamics that develop in the moment.115 Although both sets of authors arrive at similar 
conclusions albeit different methods, King articulates their convergence and highlights the 
importance of ignoring preconceived assumptions or expectations about crowd violence in 
favor of group analysis.116 Recognizing that crowds may or may not react violently is 
crucial for law enforcement in planning for and implementing crowd control tactics. 
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While acknowledging the relevance of SIT to crowd behavior, David Novelli et al. 
found that crowdedness mediates the theory in public gatherings where positive 
motivations exist between like-minded people.117 The authors studied crowd populations 
at two events where “personal space” was encroached upon, finding the loss of personal 
space at an event with positive connotations did not always result in negative emotions.118 
Similar to Hogg, Terry, and White, Novelli et al. found significance in the theory of self-
categorization when viewing crowd behavior through an SIT lens.119 Their analysis of a 
2007 demonstration in central London shows a correlation between the importance of 
proximity to the demonstration’s center, as a function of participants’ relationship with the 
ingroup, and willingness to forego personal space, further confirming the relevance of self-
categorization.120 One’s ingroup relation to the crowd and the event can mitigate potential 
negative emotions related to crowdedness due to an individual’s ability to associate with 
different groups, assert the authors.121 This research relates to local efforts to develop 
public safety plans and manage crowd events where positive emotions and high attendance 
can create dense populations. 
John Drury and Stephen Reicher further elaborated on the variability of group 
identity when subjected to outside influence. A crowd of multiple, separate outgroups may 
merge identities into one collective identity when ingroup influences are collectively 
viewed as illegitimate.122 The authors identified five implications of ESIM. First, the 
authors find empowerment a component of group actions.123 Second, ESIM shapes 
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outgroup empowerment based on the influence of the ingroup.124 Third, the authors find a 
challenge to ingroup power by the outgroup, based on its willingness to commit illegitimate 
actions.125 Fourth, this willingness is shaped by ingroup actions collectively seen as 
illegitimate by the outgroup.126 And finally, the ingroup response should be relative to 
group identity.127 This elaboration offers insight into crowd actions, which law 
enforcement may use to project legitimacy to avoid crowd violence. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In sum, SIT is applicable and practical for understanding crowd behaviors. This 
understanding can be informative for law enforcement pre-event analysis, event operations, 
and long-term outreach and relationship building between ingroup and outgroup protesters 
prone to violence.  
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III. HOW SOCCER HOOLIGANISM INFORMS 
PROTEST VIOLENCE 
There were people being carried away on stretchers, fans on the edge of the 
pitch and players constantly looking up at their families because billiard 
balls were being thrown at the directors’ box,” he says. “I can’t tell you 
much about the football, because there was so much else going on. It was 
completely out of control. 
 —David Pleat, Luton Town F.C. Manager128 
This chapter examines crowd psychology and the theories of SIT and ESIM as a 
means for understanding intergroup violence. Crowd violence is most often studied within 
the adversarial paradigm between protesters and law enforcement. Protester-on-protester 
violence is less understood, and a new paradigm must be found to deepen an understanding 
of the dynamics involved. First, soccer hooliganism, a well-researched paradigm for 
understanding intergroup dynamics and violence, is defined. Second, the relevance of SIT 
and ESIM to soccer hooliganism is discussed. Finally, this chapter concludes with the 
correlation between soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence.  
A. SOCCER-RELATED VIOLENCE AND HOOLIGANISM 
The analogy of life to sport has helped explain and inform societies for centuries. 
The popular myth of the Olympic Games’ marathon origin depicts the distance endured by 
Pheidippides to communicate victory to Athens.129 Battles are often the context used to 
describe opponents. Succeeding against the odds is a narrative used to describe scoring in 
a competitive game against an opponent. Admirable sports performances provide 
leadership examples and principles, and the strong ties between sport and cultures both 
inform and are informed by one another. 
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Soccer hooliganism and protest violence seem odd bedfellows at first glance. What 
does the enthusiasm for a sport, especially one typically thought of as peripheral to the 
American sporting landscape, have to do with the seriousness of impassioned protest and 
the danger of interpersonal violence? The answer to this question begins with a brief 
examination of soccer-related violence and hooliganism. 
Distinguishing the violence associated with the sport of soccer is important. Ramon 
Spaaij articulates the forms of soccer-related violence in his book on soccer hooliganism. 
Player violence on the playing field and spectator violence off the playing field are distinct 
yet intertwined.130 The critical difference is between spectator violence that is triggered by 
violence on the playing field and spectator violence that is caused by spectators off the 
playing field.131 Player violence related to the competitiveness of the game may occur 
between players before, during, or after play.132 Player violence may also incite spectator 
violence off the playing field.133 However, violence between fan groups associated with 
organized soccer clubs off the playing field has been the hallmark of soccer hooliganism 
dating back to the 1970s in the United Kingdom.134 Despite different genres of violence 
associated with the sport of soccer, fan group violence is directly associated with soccer 
hooliganism. 
For populations outside the United States, the term hooliganism related to soccer 
describes a particular phenomenon familiar to those populations where soccer is a 
predominant sport. Clifford Stott—a professor of social psychology who studies crowd 
psychology and soccer hooliganism extensively—notes that the phenomenon, often 
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described as the “English disease,” is a media creation that lacks a legal definition.135 Spaaij 
provides the most precise definition on the subject: “the competitive violence of socially 
organized fan groups in [soccer], principally directed against the opposing fan groups.”136 
Fans who identify with supporter groups predisposed to violence correspond with Spaaij’s 
definition and self-categorize as hooligans, as opposed to organized non-violent fans who 
support their teams for competition and identity.137 
The seriousness of soccer hooliganism in the United Kingdom was evident both in 
the extent of the violence over the years and the research devoted to the issue. Rioting, 
looting, and assaults en route to, during, and around matches became commonplace. 
Opposing supporters infiltrated reserved stadium areas with the intent to assault and 
racially abuse minority soccer players and fans. Over the 10 years that the British Home 
Office recorded soccer-related arrests, annual arrests increased from 3,752 to 6,106 across 
the top four divisions.138 A 1985 clash between the Millwall Football Club’s Bushwacker 
hooligans and the Luton Town Football Club’s Men in Gear hooligans left 47 people 
injured and led to a new supporter membership plan, as well as temporary bans for visiting 
fans.139 Eventually, the extent of the soccer hooligan problem in the United Kingdom led 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to form a “war cabinet” on the issue in the mid-1980s.140 
As a result, the study of soccer hooliganism and crowd psychology blossomed to an extent 
later criticized by some as “over researched and ‘overpopulated,’” writes Spaaij.141 
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Numerous, varied, and often conflicting opinions about the subject constitute Spaaij’s 
argument for the necessity of continued research.142  
While termed the English disease, soccer hooliganism is also a problem for other 
countries, as reporting and research indicate. The diffusion of soccer hooliganism to 
European countries is partly related to the travel of English fans to games around Europe 
and instances of English soccer hooligan violence at soccer matches.143 A seminal event in 
Brussels, Belgium, occurred in 1985 when 39 people died and 500 people were injured 
after being crushed against a wall because a supporter group for the Liverpool Football 
Club, an English team, breached police containment lines and charged an Italian Juventus 
Football Club supporter group.144 Known as the Heysel disaster, this tragedy prompted 
more significant research into soccer hooliganism and the development of methods for 
addressing such intergroup violence.  
Soccer hooliganism is endemic to soccer supporter groups outside the United 
Kingdom as well. German sports culture has its own soccer hooliganism, such as the 
Northside and Frontline hooligan groups associated with Borussia Dortmund.145 Violence 
perpetrated by German soccer supporter groups arises not only between rival domestic and 
international teams but also between groups supporting the same team.146 According to 
Italy’s Parliamentary Antimafia Commission, Italian soccer hooligans, known as ultras, 
operate like the Mafia—they care little for the game but aim to defend their group pride, 
 
142 Spaaij, 4. 
143 Rohan Pathak, “5 Times European Football Fans Turned Hooligans,” Quint, July 2, 2017, 
https://www.thequint.com/sports/2016/06/22/5-times-football-fans-turned-hooligans-world-cup-98-uefa-
cup-74-arsenal-liverpool-france-england. 
144 Robert Chalmers, “Remembering the Heysel Stadium Disaster,” GQ (UK), May 29, 2015, 
https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/heysel-stadium-disaster-30-anniversary. 
145 “Rätselraten um Fan-Randale [Guesswork about Fan-Rampage,]” Westdeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung, December 21, 2009, https://www.waz.de/staedte/dortmund/raetselraten-um-fan-randale-
id2296418.html.]. 
146 “Fear on the Yellow Wall: Borussia Dortmund Ultras Threatened by Right-Wing Hooligans,” 
Deutsche Welle, November 11, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/fear-on-the-yellow-wall-borussia-dortmund-
ultras-threatened-by-right-wing-hooligans/a-46364501. 
29 
their team’s home area, and engage in violence.147 In Argentina, research has identified 
intergroup violence among its soccer fans as far back as 1932.148 Argentinian rivalries and 
violence continue to this day, as demonstrated by the confrontation between the Boca 
Juniors and River Plate supporter groups at the 2018 Copa Libertadores Finals in Buenos 
Aires.149 Additionally, Israel has struggled with La Familia’s violent anti-Muslim support 
of Beitar Jerusalem, an Israeli Premier League team.150 These examples of violence around 
the world all align with Spaaij’s definition of soccer hooliganism, demonstrating the issue 
as a global one, extending beyond the United Kingdom. 
B. USING SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY TO UNDERSTAND SOCCER 
HOOLIGANISM 
The study of soccer hooliganism helps to uncover intergroup dynamics. The 
changing relationships between groups are rooted in the reasoning behind an individual’s 
choice to associate with a group. In the context of crowd psychology, a duality of analysis 
has evolved between understanding a crowd either as one mass or as multiple groups. 
Although this thesis advocates the latter, the former remains in practice within law 
enforcement and affects crowd management methodologies. 
1. Crowd Psychology 
As discussed in Chapter II, crowd management methodologies originated with Le 
Bon’s late nineteenth-century social psychology theory that a crowd is one mass, without 
conscious personality, susceptible to suggestion or influence.151 The concept of crowd 
intellectual inferiority, advocated by Le Bon, propagates an idea that crowds are easily 
 
147 Tobias Jones, “Beyond the Violence, the Shocking Power the Ultras Wield Over Italian Football,” 
Guardian, April 29, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/29/beyond-the-violence-
shocking-power-ultras-wield-over-italian-football. 
148 Vic Duke and Liz Crolley, “Football Spectator Behaviour in Argentina: A Case of Separate 
Evolution,” Sociological Review 44, no. 2 (1996): 275, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1996. 
tb00425.x. 
149 Mike Meehall Wood, “Why the Copa Libertadores Riot Goes Much Further Than Just River and 
Boca,” Forbes, November 27, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemeehallwood/2018/11/27/why-the-
copa-libertadores-riot-goes-much-further-than-just-river-and-boca/. 
150 Sam Patterson, “Chaos on the Right Wing,” Howler, Fall 2017. 
151 Le Bon, The Crowd, 50. 
30 
susceptible to irrationality, including violence. This understanding has informed law 
enforcement crowd-management methodologies for decades. Indiscriminate police actions 
against crowds are evident in the history of many countries, including the 1984–1985 
miners’ strike in the United Kingdom as well as throughout the civil rights movement in 
the United States.152 More recent research finds that the perception of crowds acting as one 
irrational group is incorrect and misses opportunities for cooperation and conflict 
avoidance. Crowd management policies based on Le Bon’s view of crowds still exist, 
limiting law enforcement’s ability to ensure public safety. 
Conversely, SIT emerged in social psychology by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in 
the late twentieth century as an alternative method for understanding group dynamics.153 
The nature of a person’s decision to self-categorize with one group instead of another 
depends on a host of social constructs that determine accessibility and fit.154 These social 
constructs create an identity that highlights the dynamics between groups and helps to 
explain actions proactively or reactively. The relevance of SIT in understanding intergroup 
dynamics is especially evident when considering intergroup conflict.155 The ability for 
subsequent scholars to comprehend an emic understanding of crowd behavior informed the 
United Kingdom’s law enforcement in attempting to comprehend the social constructs 
among soccer hooligan groups. Such a comprehension provides greater context, allowing 
for preventative actions by law enforcement when working to limit violence and ensure 
public safety. 
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2. Using Social Identity Theory to Distinguish Soccer Hooligan Groups 
When comprehending a subject’s social identity construction, the context gained 
provides not only the emic understanding of the individual but also his group affiliations. 
Conversely, applying SIT to soccer hooligan groups provides the context of a group’s 
socially constructed identity as well as insight into individual identities. What is crucial in 
either examination is the definition of a group. According to Henri Tajfel, a group 
comprises one or more of the following three variables: (1) an individual must know he 
belongs to the group, (2) the idea of the group or membership may be positive or negative, 
and (3) these elements accompany emotions that reflect the individual’s view of the group 
or those in relation to the group.156 These cognitive, evaluative, and emotional components 
provide a general definition of groups—irrespective of size, scope, or structure—from 
which further analysis of group dynamics can proceed.157 The resulting appreciation of a 
group’s dynamics can help remove bias when attempting to understand its actions. 
In the context of groups in conflict, the ingroup/outgroup narrative can further 
inform the intergroup dynamics and actions. The choice of affiliation defines one’s 
ingroup.158 Nevertheless, the ingroup’s and outgroup’s narratives of dominance may differ 
dramatically. For example, a sports player from a small market identifies his team as the 
ingroup based on employment.159 However, the player’s team may be the outgroup to the 
larger-market ingroup based on financial resources and fan support. If the player’s team 
cannot financially satisfy the player, this failure might become an incentive to shift group 
identities if and when the opportunity arrives. The variables of each changing perspective 
construct a different ingroup/outgroup narrative, which may allow for mobility between 
social groups. Each analytical perspective provides a different insight into the two teams’ 
intergroup dynamics and social movement between groups. 
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Several analytical markers distinguish the ingroup/outgroup dynamic that help 
define a group, as described by Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg. Such markers provide 
insight into groups, their actions, and potential conflict.160 These markers are the “patron-
client relationship, honor/shame paradigm, limited good, and the challenge/response 
cycle.”161 A short discussion of these markers in relation to specific soccer teams and 
supporter groups illustrates the applicability of SIT. 
a. Patron-Client Relationship 
The analytical marker of a patron-client relationship not only demonstrates the 
structure of intergroup dynamics but can explain harmony between groups.162 West Ham 
United Football Club is an East London team in the English Premier League and counts a 
devoted fan base, as evident by the crowds wearing the claret and blue team colors at their 
London Stadium playing field each game.163 As a team with historic success in the league, 
lucrative television contracts, endorsements, and financial backing from its owner provide 
financial assurance and sustainability for West Ham United. It enjoys and appreciates a 
broad fan base, which includes hooligan groups such as Inter City Firm, yet does not 
depend on them for financial support to sustain the team.164 Conversely, its fans depend on 
West Ham United as the central reason for their fan support. Without West Ham United, 
there would be no need to self-categorize as fans of the team. This patronage by West Ham 
United of its client fans provides a central group identity for its fans and cohesion to achieve 
whatever goals the fans have.165 
The patron-client relationship is not always controlled hierarchically nor adhered 
to mutually. Although the club acts as the hub of the relationship, the client may not adhere 
to its patron’s wishes if they are deemed illegitimate. Following a 2009 match with 
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Millwall Football Club that devolved into violence during and after the game, West Ham 
United officials condemned the violence of its own fans.166 Yet some West Ham supporter 
groups continue to support violence and intimidation despite the club’s best efforts.167 The 
club propels its supporter group identities, but not all groups strictly adhere to the club’s 
patronage. In such a case, the challenge/response marker might offer new insight into this 
intergroup dynamic. 
b. Honor/Shame Paradigm 
Honor accorded to a group stems from admiration or respect and reflects on the 
individuals who participate in that group identity.168 Conversely, the shame afforded to a 
group based on ridicule and disrespect mirrors both the group and its individuals, further 
defining ingroup/outgroup dynamics. The rivalry between Real Madrid Football Club and 
Football Club Barcelona is rooted equally in the sport of soccer as in the history of Spain. 
The comparable success of each La Liga team fuels the fan rivalry as both teams seek 
dominance, yet the social-political context adds greater context to the honor/shame identity 
of each supporter group. Since the 1910s, “F.C. Barcelona gradually evolved into an 
important symbol of Catalan political, social, and cultural identity and came to be regarded 
by its supporters as més que un club (‘more than a club’).”169 The support garnered by 
Spanish military dictatorships for Real Madrid F.C. bolstered the rivalry and erupted in 
episodes of violence and sporting insult between both supporter groups throughout the 
twentieth century.170 The historical political imbalance between the Spanish government 
and its Catalan state defines an ingroup/outgroup disparity between each team’s supporter 
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groups still at present.171 The historical and pervasive political and sporting affiliation 
between Real Madrid and Spanish far-right politics has deepened the rivalry and defined 
the honor/shame dynamic for the F.C Barcelona supporter groups. This dynamic, as well 
as a desire for more active fan participation, saw the creation of the Boixos Nois (Crazy 
Boy) hooligan group in 1981.172 Seven hundred Boixos Nois affiliate groups now exist and 
have demonstrated their violent tendencies since inception.173 The honor/shame marker is 
insightful in explaining conflicting group identities. 
c. Limited Good 
Soccer supporter and hooligan group dynamics are not restricted to opposing teams. 
The analytical marker based on the anthropological concept of a limited good applies to 
not only visiting supporter groups but also supporters of the same team. In the Dutch 
Eredivisie premier soccer league, Feyenoord Rotterdam has a distinct history of hooligan 
violence between supporter groups based on its stadium field seating. Although the team 
typically attracted the older working-class communities of South Rotterdam, youth 
attendance increased in 1960, as evident in two distinct seating areas at the opposite ends 
of the playing field, Vak G and Vak S.174 By the end of the decade, the two youth sections 
consolidated their presence and claim to Vak S.175 Emboldened by a violent confrontation 
with Tottenham Hotspurs Football Club supporters at a 1974 Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA) Cup final, the Vak S youth violently defended their seating territory 
at subsequent home games against other Feyernoord supporter groups.176 Claims of 
physical space as part of a socially constructed identity can help define the identity but also 
may inform behavior. 
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The dynamic of a visiting supporter group to a home field is emblematic of the 
anthropological idea of a limited good.177 The home team supporter groups claim their field 
as their space, including a majority of the fan stadium seats and the surrounding 
neighborhood or city. The presence of the visiting team’s supporter groups, typically 
afforded a smaller portion of the stadium seats, is not only a loss of home “space” for the 
home team supporters but can be a physical manifestation of the visiting team’s supporter 
groups’ outgroup status.  
d. Challenge/Response Cycle 
The process of challenging one another to elicit a response is a mechanism for 
determining group honor or status.178 The success or failure of both the challenge and the 
response depends on the emic analytical hermeneutic. Sparta Rotterdam supporters were 
generally considered “friendly” compared to the spectrum of other Eredivisie supporter 
groups.179 However, like other teams, youth participation in supporter groups increased 
over time, and the Sparta Youth Crew emerged. The 1999 assault and serious injury of a 
Sparta Youth Crew member by opposing Willhem II supporters catalyzed their opposition 
to opposing groups and their desire to increase their hooligan standing through repeated 
violence against Willhem II and its supporter groups.180 Sparta Youth Crew perceived the 
assault against its members as a challenge to its honor that necessitated a response and a 
shift in group identity in favor of violence. 
3. A Progression to an Elaborated Social Identity Model 
When applied in the crowd management paradigm of law enforcement, SIT is a 
means of providing an emic understanding of intergroup dynamics using analytical 
markers. Yet there is a danger of inferring, through law enforcement analysis during crowd 
events, that intergroup conflict is inherent in either or both groups. Before Stephen 
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Reicher’s research into the 1988 Westminster Bridge protest violence in London, the 
understanding of social identity did not account for the influence of law enforcement on 
conflicting crowd groups during the event.181 Since then, continued crowd psychology 
research has progressed to ESIM, which examines how intergroup dynamics and group 
identities can shift. This model considers an individual’s group identity with potential or 
legitimate actions surrounding the position within the group. If one’s social position 
changes in the course of a crowd event, one’s social identity changes along such 
dimensions as identity content (“who we are”), identity-boundaries (who counts as “one of 
us”), definitions of legitimate behavior, and empowerment.182 
The insight gained from SIT—in articulating how group behaviors and self-
categorization can change based on external influences—reveals opportunities for law 
enforcement to employ new crowd management methodologies to limit crowd violence 
and ensure public safety. Where SIT suggests group identity, ESIM shows how crowds 
will act based on that identity and external influences they see as legitimate or otherwise.183 
This insight helps to explain factors that either precipitate or prevent crowd violence.  
4. The Elaborated Social Identity Model and Police Use of Force 
While this thesis has discussed ESIM to this point regarding crowd intergroup 
violence, external influences on crowd groups must be considered, too. The relevance of 
ESIM is how crowd groups may change their collective identity based on the influences of 
other groups and how law enforcement crowd-management effort can influence group 
identity. 
An understanding of the crowd determines the influence of law enforcement on 
crowd groups. As discussed earlier, Le Bon’s classical view of crowds is of a singular mass 
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that attains one collective mind, which is susceptible to irrational outside influences. This 
theory used to shape the view of crowds by United Kingdom law enforcement, as 
demonstrated by Drury et al. in 2003: “Officers, at least in the United Kingdom, see the 
crowd as essentially irrational and prone to the influences of powerful minorities, and 
hence disorder.”184 This perspective conflicts with the insights provided by SIT and 
contradicts the understanding SIT affords law enforcement in influencing a crowd’s 
potential for violence. 
ESIM updates this understanding of law enforcement’s influence, demonstrating 
how crowds without violent tendencies may turn violent upon encountering law 
enforcement or actively suppress individual violent acts from within their own group to 
retain a non-violent identity. As shown in research on violent encounters between law 
enforcement and soccer supporters, when crowd control methodologies become 
indiscriminately aggressive, supporter groups without violent tendencies may become 
violent when control methodologies are deemed illegitimate.185 In other cases where crowd 
control measures were indiscriminately applied, previously incongruent crowd groups 
altered their group identities to align collectively against law enforcement tactics, which 
were deemed illegitimate and required a violent, defensive response.186 Evidence 
demonstrates that external framing, based on classical views of a crowd, often drives crowd 
control methodologies.187 Fomenting the idea and fear of potentially violent crowd groups 
can initiate crowd control methodologies that may not be appropriate for the actual crowd 
group identities.188 Such inappropriate methodologies may then alter a non-violent group 
identity to one of violence.189 Even a passive-aggressive approach to crowd control, such 
as deploying paramilitary law enforcement forces as a deterrence, may be seen as 
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illegitimate and shift group identities toward violence.190 This failure in applying an 
understanding of ESIM featured prominently in the law enforcement efforts used to address 
soccer hooligans, as seen in past news reports and research. 
The appropriate application of ESIM in managing crowds to avoid violence is based 
on four principles identified by the research of Stephen Reicher and colleagues: education, 
facilitation, communication, and differentiation.191 Educating law enforcement on group 
identities through crowd management resources is a precondition for helping differentiate 
between legitimate group intentions and isolated insurgent actions that could both interrupt 
intergroup dynamics and be mistaken by law enforcement as actual group intentions.192 
Next, understanding the legitimate intentions of groups can assist crowd management 
efforts in facilitating the groups’ intentions.193 Instead of presupposing a need for reactive 
crowd control efforts, facilitation provides for proactive crowd management by conferring 
not only group legitimacy but the legitimacy of law enforcement’s actions as well. 
Moreover, while communication between law enforcement and crowd groups is vital, 
especially in moments of conflict, the method and means are just as critical.194 Planning 
efforts should consider the sender/receiver relationship between law enforcement and each 
group, as well as the means for honest communication during tense and emotional 
situations. Finally, the ability for crowd management efforts to differentiate between crowd 
groups is crucial in understanding legitimate crowd actions and behaviors that run counter 
to the group identity, which could disrupt non-violent crowd events.195 These final three 
components are outcomes of applying ESIM as a means of reducing influences that might 
incite crowd violence.  
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SIT provides a framework for the analysis of group dynamics. The analytical 
markers provide insight into possible group motivations and responses. ESIM advances the 
psychological understanding of group dynamics and how they can change. The awareness 
of a group’s socially constructed identity and its propensity to change based on external 
influences provides a greater understanding of possible group behaviors. 
5. Police Liaison Teams 
As discussed earlier, the ability for law enforcement to communicate with crowd 
groups before, during, and after an event is one principle of ESIM. This critical ability 
helps law enforcement—intent on facilitating legitimate crowd group intentions—to 
prevent misunderstandings with groups as well as explain changing law enforcement 
behaviors to help maintain its legitimacy in the groups’ eyes. This approach, known as 
“liaison-based public order policing” in the United Kingdom, finds communication 
between crowd management efforts and crowd groups through dedicated liaison police 
officers successful in reducing conflict.196  
The use of these officers in liaison-based public order policing, known as police 
liaison teams (PLTs), offers many opportunities to convey legitimacy and thereby 
minimize intergroup conflict: 
Their function is to promote perceptions of police legitimacy among crowd 
participants and use their communication and negotiation skills to resolve 
and create solutions for minor problems. They also play an important role 
in building relationships of trust with crowd participants, gathering 
information and otherwise creating a police capability for avoiding the 
undifferentiated use of force against crowds as a whole.197 
While representative of the ESIM communication principle, their principal role is in 
facilitating the human right to gather and voice an opinion.198 Common crowd control 
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tactics, such as kettling (large police formations that move collectively to isolate and 
contain crowd elements), cordoning off areas, and controlling traffic, may be seen as 
offensive to certain crowd groups who do not understand the method nor the reasoning for 
its application.199 PLTs are separate from these tactics, solely providing direct 
communication between groups and law enforcement leaders.  
The communication link between crowd groups and law enforcement is best 
initiated by PLTs in advance of the event. The intention is to build rapport with the hope 
of establishing both a long-term relationship and understood legitimacy of both the group 
identities by law enforcement and law enforcement crowd-management methods by the 
groups.200 Establishing this relationship over time builds long-term trust that is helpful 
during moments of intense emotion that arise at crowd events. Such developed trust 
between PLTs and groups can help overcome tense exchanges during stressful events while 
also being a long-term point of contact between groups and law enforcement. In either case, 
the development of greater interconnections between police and crowd groups is critical to 
PLT effectiveness and can positively shape long-term relationships between both parties. 
During the event, the ability to communicate directly between groups and law 
enforcement leadership allows greater facilitation of the desired group intent. Group 
behavior and actions can be translated to law enforcement in the moment so that any 
misunderstanding is resolved. In this respect, the application of more aggressive crowd 
management tactics to address legitimate group behavior can be avoided through direct 
discussion with PLTs by group leaders. Additionally, law enforcement leadership may 
advise or redirect group actions that are requested, thereby offering alternative yet 
legitimate options that remain within legal crowd behaviors and avoiding more aggressive 
crowd control tactics.201 The ability to act as a conduit for messaging between groups and 
law enforcement leadership places PLTs in a critical position.  
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Communication after the event is also a critical role for PLTs as it can provide 
context to actions that might not have been conveyed in a completely effective manner 
during the event. A discussion afterward allows for greater understanding from both parties 
as to group intent and actions. As the goal of law enforcement is ongoing public safety, 
these opportunities for post-event communication become preparatory communication in 
advance of the next event.202 The role of PLTs and the relationships that develop foster a 
cyclical mode of communication, which can have a lasting, positive impact and foster 
legitimacy for all parties. 
PTLs play more than a passive role in their position as a messaging conduit. Not 
only do PLTs confer legitimacy through communication with crowd groups, but they also 
do the same in their communication with police leadership. Crowd management leadership 
can, even with PLTs embedded in crowd groups, opt to make ill-conceived decisions that 
might undermine legitimacy.203 Embedded PLTs, proficient in effective crowd 
management objectives and the legitimate intents of groups, may have a better perspective 
on necessary tactical decisions than their crowd management leadership. If their leadership 
intends to implement tactics or force that would jeopardize the legitimacy of an event, 
PLTs can police the actions and decisions of leadership by providing their embedded 
perspective to further ensure legitimacy and the intended right of free speech.204 According 
to Stott, West, and Radburn, “PLTs assist in the avoidance of conflict because they also 
actively prevent disproportionate use of coercion by police. . . . In other words, PLTs do 
not simply play a role in policing crowds, they are also important in policing the police.”205 
In this manner, the role of PLT facilitation is bi-directional and more influential than 
merely a messenger. 
The use of PLTs to achieve liaison-based public order policing in the United 
Kingdom is seen as taking the next step in the progression of modern policing. The 
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securitized era of policing, an advent of more aggressive protest events over the past 
decades, has led to a methodology that reduces risk to crowd management resources 
through “strategic incapacitation” of protest groups.206 While enhancing methodologies 
that provide greater security for crowd management resources, the management method 
itself may incite the protest unrest it aims to prevent. The use of PLTs within the SIT and 
ESIM paradigm shift the crowd management methodology to a new “strategic facilitation” 
model whose purpose is to encourage legitimate, democratic protests and avoid 
undifferentiated use of force intended to achieve public safety.207 Not only can PLTs 
address the risk associated with identified crowd groups, but in averting intergroup conflict, 
PLTs also address the risk of a loss in public trust in law enforcement from illegitimate 
violence or crowd management tactics.208 PLTs are a proactive tool for both crowd 
management efforts and crowd groups, mitigating issues before they become problems that 
lead to unfortunate outcomes. 
C. THE CORRELATION OF SOCCER HOOLIGANISM AND PROTESTER-
ON-PROTESTER VIOLENCE 
Despite the depth of research into intergroup violence associated with soccer 
supporter groups, is the political protest environment appropriately analogous? The First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the right to assemble peacefully and voice 
grievances against the government. As such, many consider political protest sacrosanct, so 
the relevance of its correlation with soccer hooliganism deserves further explanation. 
1. Analogical Analysis of Soccer Hooliganism and Protester-on-Protester 
Violence 
Soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence share four commonalities, 
presenting law enforcement with both opportunities and challenges. First, both paradigms 
endanger public safety when intergroup violence occurs. At least one of the following four 
metrics—arrests, property damage, injury, or death—are evident in intergroup violence in 
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either paradigm. These threats, within each paradigm, pose a danger to public safety that 
should be understood prima facie. Second, law enforcement methodologies based on 
classical crowd psychology theories can endanger public safety. Research demonstrates 
that methodologies that consider crowd groups as an undifferentiated mass exacerbate the 
dynamic, making any aggressive police action a reason for the crowd to question police 
legitimacy and re-categorize its group identity to challenge law enforcement.209 This same 
research has found similar group identification between soccer hooliganism and protest 
violence. Third, analytical markers explain intergroup dynamics in both paradigms. And 
fourth, in each paradigm, the labile nature of group identity is incongruent with classical 
crowd control methodologies. Regardless of paradigm, the nature of the conflict is 
explained by intergroup dynamics and the analytical markers that define groups. These 
commonalities demonstrate a correlation between the two paradigms and establish a need 
for comparative analysis, which is presented in Chapter IV, to examine how public safety 
benefits from the application of SIT by law enforcement to the protester-on-protester 
paradigm. 
2. A Framework for Analogy 
Frameworks for comparative analysis are a familiar academic tool for identifying 
similarities and differences. Within the soccer hooliganism paradigm, past research has 
used frameworks to differentiate all forms of soccer-related violence. Duke and Crowley 
posited an initial framework for forms of soccer-related violence in 1996.210 Ten years 
later, Ramon Spaaij expanded on their framework in his seminal research on soccer 
hooliganism across European cultures to address a wider range of supporter group 
behaviors that tended toward violence.211 In keeping with Spaaij’s methodology, Table 1 
presents a framework to further clarify the three commonalities possessed by soccer 
hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence. Expanding on Spaaij’s framework, Table 
1 validates the correlation between soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence 
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by identifying the applicability of SIT analytical markers, the nature of violence, and 
socially organized variables. 
Table 1. Framework for Comparative Analysis of Soccer 
Hooliganism and Protester-on-Protester Violence212 
Nature of Violence 
Socially Organized Intergroup Violence 
Soccer Hooliganism Protester-on-Protester 
Violence against or 
fighting between rivals X X 
Violence against players 
or match officials X  
Violence against police 
officers or security X X 
Damage to property X X 
Missile throwing/use of 
weapons 
X X 
Intra-group violence X  
Racial abuse or violence X X 
Use of weapons X X 
Ingroup/Outgroup X X 
Patron-Client X X 
Limited Good X X 
Honor/Shame X X 
Challenge/Response X X 
Shifting group identities X X 
 
Although this simple framework identifies a strong similarity between the two 
paradigms of intergroup violence, its limitations must be noted. First, both forms of 
violence are a small part of the overall problem of violence in civil society, and many 
factors not listed above can account for violence. Therefore, a greater elaboration of these 
factors might result in a different analysis. Second, the global nature of soccer hooliganism 
means countless underlying variables of violence may be attributable to specific countries, 
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regions, and cultures. Nevertheless, in that sense, SIT’s ability to span these cultures and 
norms further demonstrates its relevance. 
46 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
AND CROWD MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES 
At that moment, a massive column of hundreds of Unite the Right 
demonstrators marched west down Market Street towards the southeast 
entrance of Emancipation Park. Led by members of the League of the South 
and the Traditionalist Worker Party, they wore helmets and carried shields, 
flagpoles, and pepper spray. The crowd of counter-protesters saw this, and 
they rushed east to form their own blockade in front of the clergy. They 
locked arms and blocked Market Street. . . . Unite the Right demonstrators 
pushed forward with their shields and hit the counter-protesters with 
flagpoles. . . . The counter-protesters fought back and tried to grab the 
flagpoles away. Eventually, the demonstrators pushed the counter-
protesters away with brute force and a cloud of pepper spray. 
 —Independent Review of the 2017 Protest Events in Charlottesville213 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BACKGROUND 
Crowd violence may never be eradicated, but significantly reducing or resolving it 
to a minor or isolated issue can appreciably increase public safety. Identifying useful 
theories and methodologies is possible through an analytical comparison of events to 
differentiate between outcomes that are applicable and those that are not. When viewed 
separately, soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence both exemplify 
intergroup conflict. Despite one based in sport and the other in politics, both represent 
groups of individuals whose identity is rooted in their perceived group identity and 
allegiance. The existence of group identity between both paradigms aligns with SIT, which 
allows for comparative analysis. 
1. Methodology 
This chapter uses comparative case study analysis to identify commonalities and 
differences across multiple crowd events to determine the relevance of SIT and ESIM in 
identifying crowd control methodologies that can help ensure public safety. This research 
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uses a comparative lens analysis method to establish the correlation between soccer 
hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence.214 In 2004, UEFA held its European 
Championship, a quadrennial soccer competition among European national soccer teams 
known as Euro2004. UEFA sold 1.5 million tickets for 31 soccer matches, presenting a 
significant crowd management challenge to Portuguese law enforcement.215 The 
Portuguese government led a significant planning effort to address the influx of people 
attending the tournament, including potential soccer hooligan supporter groups.216 A 2017 
far-right, conservative rally in Portland, Oregon, challenged local law enforcement to 
afford political groups with divergent opinions the opportunity to voice their opinions. 
Following months of violent protest clashes and the murder of two civilians by a white 
supremacist, this crowd event ended peacefully. Later that same year, thousands of 
protesters clashed repeatedly in Charlottesville, Virginia, over the removal of Confederate-
era statues.217 Despite concerted efforts by the Charlottesville Police Department and the 
Virginia State Police to prepare a crowd management plan, the attendance and violence of 
the August Unite the Right rally caught the agencies unprepared.  
These cases are analyzed along four components: group analysis, coordination, 
crowd control methodology, and legitimacy. Each component is crucial in using SIT 
and an ESIM in crowd management to prevent or minimize crowd violence and ensure 
public safety. 
2. Grounds for Comparison 
A major European soccer tournament may seem at odds with a large urban protest, 
but after further analysis, certain commonalities allow such a comparison. Crowd size, law 
enforcement, and incidents that jeopardized public safety are objective variables for 
 
214 Kerry Walk, “How to Write a Comparative Analysis,” Harvard College Writing Center, accessed 
August 3, 2019, https://writingcenter.fas.harvard.edu/pages/how-write-comparative-analysis. 
215 “1.5 Million Euro Fans for Portugal,” CNN International, April 5, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2004/SPORT/football/04/05/euro.fans/. 
216 Clifford Stott and Otto Adang, End of Award Report: Crowd Dynamics, Policing, and 
“Hooliganism” at “Euro2004” (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 2005), 4, https://s3-eu-west-1. 
amazonaws.com. 
217 Hunton & Williams, Independent Review of the 2017 Protest, 1–4. 
49 
comparison. Crowd group passion is a subjective variable without measurement but was 
an element apparent in each case study. 
Euro2004 consisted of 31 separate soccer matches across Portugal, each averaging 
33,780 for match attendance.218 In contrast, the 2017 Portland crowd event drew only 
several thousand participants but posed similar complex crowd management challenges. 
The attendance by protesters and counter-protesters at the series of Charlottesville protests 
in 2017 grew to a size and complexity on par with that faced by Portuguese match cities.  
Both leadership and event planners marshaled significant numbers of law 
enforcement to prepare for the sizeable crowds at each event. Although research showed 
no specific number of law enforcement officers, the Portuguese Security Police and 
National Guard deployed significant numbers of riot squads and other response elements 
for each Euro2004 soccer match.219 Portland Police coordinated their response between 
local and federal law enforcement to manage numerous crowd groups with conflicting 
identities. During the Charlottesville protests, agencies from the city of Charlottesville, the 
Charlottesville Sheriff’s Office, the Albermarle County Sheriff’s Office and emergency 
communications, the University of Virginia, and the State of Virginia assisted the 
Charlottesville Police Department in planning crowd control efforts.220 Each event had 
command-and-control elements, officers, and riot squads available for crowd control, 
among other response elements. 
Although passion is hard to quantify, a discussion of identified groups present at 
each event begins to shed light on the seriousness with which each approached their 
attendance. Euro2004 involved national soccer teams from 16 European nations. Although 
elements of each national supporter group attended the tournament, officials were chiefly 
concerned with the attendance of large high-risk German and English hooligan supporter 
groups prone to intergroup violence.221 In comparison, the participant passion and 
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dedication surrounding the nationalist and racial themes that spawned the Portland and 
Charlottesville protests were equal to that of the Euro2004 tournament. Though different 
in interests and motivations, all groups represented strong allegiance, outgroup affiliation, 
and a real threat of violent confrontation. 
This case study focuses solely on the Unite the Right rally on August 12, out of the 
three crowd events that occurred in Charlottesville in 2017. This specific event correlates 
with the Euro2004 tournament and Portland rally in several ways. All events were planned 
and legal. The prior notice for each event allowed significant planning opportunities for 
local and state officials. Law enforcement agencies at each event considered and 
implemented a crowd management methodology. Additionally, substantial information on 
the crowd groups’ perception of legitimacy was available for all events.  
B. CASE STUDY: 2004 UNION OF EUROPEAN FOOTBALL 
ASSOCIATIONS EUROPEAN SOCCER TOURNAMENT 
The unexpected Greek victory in the 2004 UEFA European Championship 
concluded a tournament with relatively few instances of intergroup violence. A quadrennial 
tournament of European national men’s soccer teams, this event prompted concerns of 
various national hooligan supporter groups descending upon Portugal and its host cities.222 
Past national team tournaments experienced significant problems with hooligans. The 1998 
World Cup saw intense violence at several games, including 35 hospitalized and 50 
arrested at the England v. Tunisia game.223 The 2000 UEFA European Championship 
tournament totaled 965 English fans arrested for rioting.224 Such disturbances set the stage 
for the 2004 iteration, and Portuguese officials intended to be prepared. 
Ahead of the tournament, Portuguese planning officials established a partnership 
with British social psychology researchers to implement contemporary crowd psychology 
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and identified best practices. 225 The tournament was used to study and find conclusions 
regarding crowd management methodologies at the Euro2004 tournament with the stated 
intent “to minimize conflict and promote non-violence among high-risk fan groups.”226 
Research was conducted at 16 of the 31 matches across the 31 days of the tournament. Of 
interest from an analytical perspective, the partnership covered only the Policia de 
Seguranca Publica (Public Security Police, or PSP) and not the Guarda Nacional 
Republicana (Republican National Guard, or GNR), yet observational research was 
conducted at games where both security forces managed crowd control.  
1. Group Analysis 
Before the tournament, the research group and Portuguese authorities attempted to 
understand the potential crowd groups that might attend the tournament. Games between 
teams with historical hooligan groups or rivalries were considered higher risk. Attention 
was not limited to historical hooligan groups but included the underlying culture of soccer 
fans to differentiate between violent and enthusiastic group behaviors. This awareness 
aligned with an understanding of crowd groups based on SIT. 
2. Coordination 
Providing an effective and consistent crowd control methodology is determined by 
the coordination of the agencies involved in planning and implementation. The PSP led 
extensive discussions on the use of SIT and ESIM and its relation to policing, crowd 
control, and crowd dynamics.227 This consultation translated into instruction and education 
for PSP leadership, as well as training for PSP commanders and police trainers to establish 
a foundation for understanding the concepts of SIT and ESIM.228 The GNR chose not to 
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participate in applying these concepts.229 Outcomes discussed later highlight how this 
dichotomy further illuminates the usefulness of SIT and ESIM in crowd management. 
3. Crowd Control Management 
PSP forces implemented a graduated crowd management methodology. At the 
lowest level, pairs of officers in standard uniforms solely surveilled, communicated with, 
and encouraged lawful, enthusiastic fan actions.230 This non-aggressive, relational police 
presence in the crowd correlates with the liaison-based protest policing model and the use 
of dedicated PLTs, as discussed in Chapter III. Additional groups of four officers who 
could rapidly deploy supported the patrol pairs, either with or without protective riot gear, 
depending on the difficulty of the issue.231 Finally, intervention squads were available, with 
protective riot gear and weapons, to operate in support with an aggressive riot mode.232 
This graduated approach implemented “a strategy of ‘low profile’ policing with graded and 
information-led interventions designed specifically to differentiate between those acting in 
a ‘disorderly’ manner and those fans who were behaving legitimately.”233 This strategy 
aligned with concepts of group identity and the ability of groups to shift identity when 
faced with influences deemed illegitimate.234 
4. Legitimacy 
The perception of crowd management by fans was considered in the application of 
this graduated approach. During games between teams with no or low-risk supporter 
groups, only plainclothes officers monitored fan activity and intergroup dynamics.235 At 
games with groups of higher concern, the PSP had paramilitary crowd management forces 
available to support operations aggressively, if needed. These forces were intentionally 
 
229 Stott and Adang, 4. 
230 Stott and Adang, 7. 
231 Stott and Adang, 7–8. 
232 Stott and Adang, 8. 
233 Stott and Adang, 7. 
234 Stott, “Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing,” 12. 
235 Stott and Adang, Crowd Dynamics, 8. 
53 
concealed from attendees of the tournament games so that the perceived legitimacy of 
crowd management methodologies and the potential use of paramilitary forces did not 
motivate crowd groups to alter identity and social construction to an aggressive posture.236 
Demonstrating restraint by interdicting isolated crowd issues, rather than indiscriminately 
applying aggressive crowd management tactics toward all crowd groups, builds legitimacy 
for both the law enforcement efforts and the identities of individual crowd groups.237 This 
restraint, in turn, promotes groups’ “self-policing” of members whose actions contradict 
the group identity.238 The legitimacy conferred on a crowd group by law enforcement 
through crowd management methodologies can be reciprocated when groups address 
individual acts of disruption to prevent their loss of legitimacy. This balanced crowd 
control methodology demonstrated to fans the legitimacy and appropriateness of efforts, 
based on the understood risk. 
5. Outcomes 
The general opinion of Euro2004 concluded it was one of the safest international 
soccer tournaments staged in Europe.239 Despite the attendance of known hooligan groups, 
Portuguese security limited its violent influence.240 Statistics from the tournament indicate 
that two incidents of serious violence and 53 arrests occurred.241 Post-event analysis by the 
associated social psychology researchers indicates, however, the policing methods were 
indeed a significant contributing factor.242 The different crowd management 
methodologies applied by PSP and GNR forces affected the outcomes. As noted earlier, 
the PSP aligned its crowd management methodologies with best practices identified by the 
researchers, which included SIT and ESIM. The GNR chose not to adopt these 
methodologies. Where the GNR did provide crowd management, it used methodologies 
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indiscriminately without factoring in legitimate group identities and behaviors or 
graduating application.243 The relevance of SIT and ESIM becomes apparent when the 
violence and arrest statistics are parsed between the security forces. The two serious 
incidents of violence and all but one arrest occurred in Albufeira, where GNR forces 
managed crowd control.244 Tournament sites managed by the PSP incurred only one arrest 
during the entire tournament.245 The applicability of SIT and an ESIM is evident through 
this lens. 
Post-tournament research found that issues of legitimacy contributed greatly 
toward influencing non-violent behaviors among crowd groups, thus enhancing public 
safety. Less than half of the fans surveyed recognized an overall police presence.246 This 
graduated presence of crowd management forces produced a positive view and sense of 
legitimacy of the methodology in the majority of fans.247 This positive view and legitimacy 
extended between supporter groups, including identified hooligan groups as well.248 
C. CASE STUDY: JUNE 4, 2017, FREE SPEECH RALLY IN PORTLAND, 
OREGON 
In the eight months before June 4, 2017, Portland experienced numerous violent 
protest events involving conservative and liberal groups. Following the 2016 presidential 
election, three days of peaceful protests devolved into riots between anarchist groups 
involved in “criminal and destructive behavior” and fellow protesters attempting to prevent 
their damaging acts.249 In March 2017, a neighboring city hosted a pro-Trump rally that 
was met with counter-protesters who engaged in verbal confrontations, with a few reported 
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minor scuffles.250 The following month, an annual Portland parade had to be canceled after 
receiving threats of violence for including a float sponsored by the local Republican 
party.251 Permitted Portland May Day events were declared a riot as different liberal protest 
groups caused significant damage to Portland’s downtown property.252 Later that month, 
two men were stabbed to death while defending two Muslim women from the verbal abuse 
of a man later found to have connections to local white supremacist and extremist 
groups.253 The local response to these events, coupled with the shock from the murders, 
coalesced in a counter-protest response to the permitted Free Speech Rally on June 4 in 
support of President Trump and the First Amendment, organized by Joey Gibson, 
conservative activist and founder of the national far-right group, Patriot Prayer.254  
1. Group Analysis 
Whether the Portland Police Bureau specifically understood and utilized SIT to 
appreciate the intergroup dynamics in advance of the June 4 crowd event is unknown. The 
preparatory actions by the special events sergeant, the officer in charge of the bureau’s 
Rapid Response Team, suggest a desire to understand and work with all the attending 
groups to ensure public safety, which is reminiscent of SIT and ESIM. Weeks prior to the 
event, the sergeant contacted Gibson and Patriot Prayer to define expectations for a 
peaceful rally.255 Through this process, he identified several other conservative action 
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groups intending to attend the rally. The Oath Keepers and the Three Percenters, additional 
far-right groups, planned to attend the rally to provide security for Patriot Prayer.256 Both 
groups, partners in the Pacific Patriot Network, had separately attended past local and state 
events with rifles and other weapons to protect conservative protest groups, prompting 
concern for violence at the Portland event on June 4.257 Continued contact from the 
sergeant with far-right rally attendees clarified which groups would be in attendance and 
which proclaimed representation but were no longer formally affiliated. This clarification 
differentiated various conservative ingroup/outgroup identities and their patronage 
dynamics, informing Portland Police intelligence prior to the Free Speech Rally.258  
Through research and outreach, the special events sergeant identified separate 
groups within the liberal counter-protest movement as well. Efforts were made to contact 
local anti-fascist group Rose City Antifa to define the same expectations for a peaceful 
rally.259 Local and national Antifa groups espouse a violent physical defense against far-
right efforts seen as white supremacist and hateful.260 Within the Antifa attendance, a Black 
Bloc group was expected that could bring an anarchist element of anti-government and 
anti-capitalism to an already tenuous event.261 Additionally, non-violent protester groups 
were expected to present themselves as a counter-voice to perceived hateful messaging by 
Patriot Prayer. The competing interests within the Antifa movement presented challenging 
patronage dynamics for Portland Police to plan for. The mixture of peaceful liberal 
protesters with those who advocate violent conflict presented ingroup/outgroup dynamics 
within the counter-protest effort. 
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2. Coordination 
Preparation at the site of the Free Speech Rally required concerted coordination to 
ensure effective actions that granted public safety and free speech for all. The designated 
site in Portland, Oregon, for the rally was the Terry Shrunk Plaza, a property owned by the 
federal government. This required the involvement of the U.S. Federal Protective Service 
in the development of crowd expectations and an understanding of jurisdictional 
boundaries.262 The special events sergeant spent significant time developing and delivering 
intelligence reports for the Portland Police Bureau on expected groups and their 
motivations.263 Portland Fire & Rescue embedded Rapid Response Team emergency 
medical technicians within the police response, coordinating efforts between the two 
agencies.264 Additionally, the sergeant actively remained in contact with all identified 
protest groups throughout the crowd event to communicate police concerns and actions, as 
well as address group-specific concerns and issues.265 
3. Crowd Control Management 
Crowd management efforts by Portland Police aimed to allow all participants the 
opportunity to voice their opinions freely in a safe environment.266 An area was designated 
for the permitted Free Speech Rally, separated from three distinct counter-protest groups 
by wide streets and enforced by police.267 As described earlier, the special events sergeant 
personally communicated with protest groups to address crowd issues, including the 
prohibition of projectiles and the infiltration of far-left protesters into the permitted Free 
Speech Rally group area.268 This non-aggressive, relational approach to communicating 
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with available crowd groups reflects the tenets of the liaison-based protest policing model 
used in the United Kingdom, as discussed in previous chapters.  
The Portland Police Rapid Response Team deployed wearing full paramilitary-
style tactical uniforms, based on the identified risk-profile of the event, to enforce the 
separate protest areas.269 Additionally, the team used explosives and pepper balls to prevent 
violent outbreaks and control isolated crowd unrest.270 
4. Legitimacy 
The Portland Police Bureau’s efforts were consistent among all groups but were 
received differently depending on the groups’ specific frame. The far-right groups were 
receptive to efforts to allow their event and ensure safety. These groups understood the 
police expectations for crowd groups and complied, agreeing not to act in a manner that 
could enflame crowd tension as they understood Portland Police were actively working to 
ensure their safety and the right to assemble.271 These, as well as past involvements with 
Portland Police, created a frame of relative trust between local law enforcement and far-
right groups that added legitimacy to the far-right groups ahead of the Free Speech Rally. 
Conversely, the frame within which far-left groups perceived Portland Police was 
starkly different and did not create the same legitimacy. The special events sergeant had 
made the same overtures to different far-left groups, which received the communications 
negatively both before and during the rally.272 Coupled with a perceived history of mistrust 
surrounding police violence and human rights violations, relative trust was not achieved 
before the rally. The deployment and actions of officers in paramilitary-style tactical 
uniforms at the event were seen as infringing upon the counter-protesters’ rights to free 
speech and democracy, exactly as described by Hill and Berger in Chapter II.273 
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Despite the threat of violence between politically opposed crowd groups, the June 
4 Free Speech Rally suffered no crowd violence and relatively few arrests.274 Both Portland 
Police and city leaders were relieved that past instances of protest violence did not occur.275 
It was reported that Joey Gibson had spent considerable time during the rally in a political 
debate with one counter-protester, resulting in mutual agreement, to an extent.276 Although 
no direct evidence was released stating SIT or ESIM were utilized by Portland Police to 
enhance public safety, the reported communications between law enforcement and crowd 
groups correlate with management methods associated with these crowd psychology 
theories. 
D. CASE STUDY: 2017 UNITE THE RIGHT PROTESTS IN 
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 
The decision to remove statues of Confederate generals Robert E. Lee and Thomas 
“Stonewall” Jackson in 2017 from the Charlottesville, Virginia, town square prompted a 
series of protests steeped in the themes of nationalism, race, and local history that 
progressively became more complex for local law enforcement to manage in the face of 
protest violence. An initial unpermitted rally by the local and national extreme right 
protesting the removal of both statues in mid-May prompted a counter-protest the 
following day, provoking a further response from the opposition, which turned violent.277 
Less than two months later, a permitted protest by a local Ku Klux Klan group provided 
law enforcement more time to prepare and resulted in no violence or arrests, despite the 
threat.278  
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On August 12, a permitted rally dubbed “Unite the Right” prompted multiple 
groups to marshal their supporters to gather in protest or counter-protest of the professed 
ideologies. Despite a concerted planning effort, law enforcement was still unprepared for 
the crowd size and violence between protester groups, which turned deadly when a driver 
intentionally struck a protester with his car.279 The three protest events in August 
challenged local law enforcement in ways they were unprepared for and are emblematic of 
the threat all local communities may face during protest events. 
1. Group Analysis 
The Charlottesville Police Department was the agency described as conducting 
most of the information-gathering on possible crowd groups. Its efforts proceeded along 
three tracks: an open-source review, information from other law enforcement agencies and 
advocacy groups, and human intelligence.280 The information gathered addressed which 
groups and how many might attend and whether their intended purpose was violent or non-
violent.281 Four groups were identified with historical conflicts with at least one of the other 
three groups, along with numerous others whose conflict history could not be identified.282 
No specific approach for gathering group information was documented. Only a tenuous 
correlation might be made between the information-gathering efforts and SIT due to an 
indirect ingroup/outgroup awareness that different groups with conflicting intentions might 
attend the Unite the Right rally. 
2. Coordination 
The city of Charlottesville and its police department attempted to be the primary 
coordinators of the response to the rally. They relied on a range of other public and private 
relationships—including the Virginia State Patrol, the University of Virginia Police 
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Department, and the Charlottesville Fire Department—for assistance with information, 
logistics, and operational support.283 Before the rally, this coordination effort experienced 
both successes and failures. Outreach was achieved with the community, local clergy 
groups, rally organizers, identified groups planning to attend who were willing to speak 
with the police department, and partner emergency response agencies. However, individual 
actions or miscommunications among planners often thwarted these efforts. The Virginia 
State Patrol’s operational plan was intentionally withheld from the Charlottesville Police 
Department.284 Efforts to demonstrate transparency and legitimacy in the planned crowd 
control methods by communicating elements of the plan were rejected by Charlottesville 
Police Department leadership, as was an effort to induce all participating crowd groups to 
commit to non-violence to paint any violence as illegitimate.285  
Other law enforcement agencies from around the country with experience in these 
particular crowd groups and management of protester-on-protester violence offered 
valuable operational information, but planning efforts failed to capitalize on it.286 The only 
system for coordination that was implemented was the Incident Command System, used 
by operational emergency responders in accordance with national practice.287 At the rally, 
the use of the Incident Command System failed to aid in incident coordination because of 
a lack of communication and full implementation among all responding agencies. Among 
the many efforts to communicate and coordinate between numerous planning and 
participant groups, no single successful effort was consistently applied throughout the 
event. Instead, many failures to coordinate were identified in the post-incident review. 
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3. Crowd Control Methodology 
Before the rally, the Charlottesville Police Department did not discuss specific 
crowd control methodologies to be used.288 Moreover, Charlottesville Police Department 
personnel did not attend the Virginia State Patrol training in mobile field force, which was 
intended for all law enforcement members.289 No other preparation for crowd control was 
identified. 
The implementation of crowd control methodologies by the Charlottesville Police 
Department and other law enforcement agencies conformed to those associated with a more 
classical understanding of crowd psychology behaviors. One hundred sixty officers were 
deployed around Emancipation Park.290 The site intended for crowd gathering was divided 
into two areas, one for the Unite the Right protesters and another for all other counter-
protesters.291 The implemented operational plan placed no officers within each crowd 
group to address specific incidents of violence.292 Regarding instruction on disorderly 
conduct and when to engage to minimize the potential for greater violence, operational 
guidance changed abruptly just before the event, and Charlottesville officers understood it 
differently.293 Because Charlottesville officers did not receive protective gear for crowd 
control, they complained of a lack of safety planning and thus expressed a desire not to 
engage acts of public disorder.294 Ultimately, the plan was to wait until crowd disorder 
reached a level deemed an unlawful assembly, at which point the 200-member Virginia 
State Patrol paramilitary Mobile Field Force, staged at a distance, would clear the rally 
area.295 No evidence suggested any crowd management resources were dedicated to real-
time communication with crowd groups with the intent to avoid intergroup conflict, as 
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described in the liaison-based protest policing model discussed in Chapter III. Such a 
reductive response was emblematic of a classical view of crowd behavior. 
4. Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of law enforcement efforts at the Unite the Right rally was in 
question before it began and further devolved as the rally events unfolded. As noted earlier, 
the lack of planning and coordination among all agencies created an atmosphere of 
confusion and contradiction among the law enforcement officers tasked with providing 
crowd management. Competing perspectives on the gravity of the threat to public safety 
prevented timely assistance to University police officers by Charlottesville officers.296 
Separate operational understandings between Charlottesville Police and Virginia State 
Patrol officers created questions of officer engagement and contradictory arrest 
protocols.297 Orders not to engage in instances of violence between protesters caused 
officers to fail to ensure public safety.298 Crowd group members asked the police to 
intervene in such instances but were rebuffed.299 These examples demonstrated a crowd 
control methodology without legitimacy to the crowd groups. 
A lack of legitimacy altered group identity in the days before the Unite the Right 
rally. The perception of law enforcement’s lack of ability to satisfy crowd group concerns 
over public safety affected the interactions of these groups with police. Groups permitted 
to attend the rally were not truthful with city planning efforts or changed their plans without 
informing the city.300 Other groups that had not intended to participate became concerned 
about law enforcement planning efforts, chose to attend the rally anyway, and refused 
cooperation with law enforcement.301  
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Because crowd groups met an environment without an effective means for ensuring 
public safety, the need to ensure their own safety legitimized the possible use of violence 
in self-defense, a newly constructed understanding of their group identities. Instances of 
violence and self-defense among many different crowd groups occurred while law 
enforcement took no action.302 Although certain groups attending the Unite the Right rally 
might have been prone to violence, the number and scale of violent episodes among many 
crowd groups demonstrate, at least, the need for a violent response as a means of defense. 
Partaking in offensive or defensive actions that are contrary to a group’s identity 
demonstrates a shifting social construction, which is described in ESIM of current crowd 
psychology. 
5. Outcome 
The Unite the Right rally had a lasting effect on the lives of many protesters and 
the city of Charlottesville. One protester was killed, and 14 were injured in protester-on-
protester violence.303 Arrests were made on federal charges of attempting to incite a riot.304 
The community of Charlottesville suffered a schism of identity that still divides it.305 There 
was no apparent application of SIT or ESIM principles to prevent or mitigate crowd 
violence. In hindsight, there were opportunities where it might have been valuable. 
SIT provides the opportunity for analysis and understanding of intergroup 
dynamics. The post-incident review indicates that the Charlottesville Police Department 
did receive extensive information on crowd group planning.306 No understanding based on 
analytical markers provided insight that guided the department’s planning. Nor did analysis 
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by any involved law enforcement agency lead to a consistent crowd control methodology. 
Despite a review of individual crowd groups, operations continued, rooted in a more 
classical understanding of crowd behaviors. 
A lack of planning and coordination, as well as the crowd control methodology 
employed, created questions of legitimacy, which altered group identities in ways not 
understood by law enforcement. Crowd groups previously indisposed to violence or 
conflict with other groups acted either offensively or defensively in ways that jeopardized 
public safety.  
E. SUMMARY 
The following comparative analysis offers insight into whether SIT was applied in 
the three cases. The results of its use, or lack thereof, offer ideas for reducing crowd 
violence and enhancing public safety, which are discussed in Chapter V. 
1. Similarities 
Law enforcement agencies involved with each crowd event applied some form of 
crowd theory to their preparation and management, whether knowingly or not. In Portugal, 
the planning effort consciously adopted the use of SIT and ESIM crowd theories under the 
guidance of research partners based on their success at previous crowd events. No official 
documentation indicated Portland Police consciously utilized SIT or ESIM in its crowd 
management methods, yet analysis indicates its methodology reflects the concepts of SIT 
and ESIM. By contrast, in Charlottesville, crowd management methods were rooted in 
classical views of the behavior of crowds.  
Legitimacy, or a lack thereof, played a role in all three crowd events. In both 
Portugal and Portland, law enforcement planning and crowd methodologies both 
established and conveyed legitimacy. All crowd groups found the PSP’s efforts to 
understand the various crowd groups, including both hooligan and non-violent supporter 
groups, and their graduated crowd management methodology to be justified and effective. 
Participating far-right crowd groups understood and validated Portland Police’s concerted 
efforts as legitimate. In contrast, the far-left groups, based on historical mistrust, did not 
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appreciate these efforts. This targeted approach resulted in constructive communication 
during the event and the far-right groups’ willingness to comply with police requests for 
non-violence. Conversely, police communication was not positively received during the 
event, and disorderly conduct did occur within the far-left crowd groups. No crowd 
management methods used by law enforcement in Charlottesville, Virginia, achieved 
legitimacy with the groups. 
2. Differences 
Although each case study indicates that a particular crowd theory guided law 
enforcement crowd management, the specific theoretical approaches used provided 
different outcomes. Where SIT and ESIM were applied, knowingly or not, instances of 
arrest, violence, and injury or death were low or non-existent. In Portugal and Portland, 
intergroup violence was low. The use of SIT and ESIM in Portugal and Portland did not 
wholly eliminate arrests or personal injury. The soccer matches managed by the PSP did 
incur one arrest for disorderly conduct. The Portland Police incurred only four arrests for 
disorderly conduct at the Free Speech Rally.307 Additionally, certain crowd groups did 
launch missiles at other groups and attempted to infiltrate opposing groups to cause 
disruption and unrest. However, no significant, ongoing violence between crowd groups 
erupted. 
The classical approach to crowd behavior taken in Charlottesville provided 
different results. As discussed earlier, law enforcement understood the difference in groups 
attending the rally but categorized them all as one group whose expected irrationality 
would allow an indiscriminate crowd management methodology to resolve the incident. 
This approach resulted in numerous arrests, injuries, and the death of one rally attendee. 
The methodology applied by the PSP in Portugal was markedly different from the 
other two case studies. The application of a graduated crowd management methodology, 
rooted in SIT and ESIM, allowed for tactical adjustment and alteration based on an 
understanding of the crowd groups and group behaviors. The graduation flexed to meet the 
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variables of identified crowd groups in the preplanning phase. Additionally, the scaled 
application of police officers in the field, as well as paramilitary units, allowed for 
flexibility in the moment by on-scene law enforcement leadership. The embrace of SIT and 
ESIM by the PSP directly affected its crowd management methodology, affording a 
graduated approach that flexed to meet changing intergroup dynamics. 
The use of PLTs differentiated the methodology applied by the PSP and Portland 
Police from the Charlottesville case.308 Placing law enforcement officers among crowd 
groups with the intention of positively interacting with fans and addressing supporter 
questions, as well as to preemptively disrupt crowd instability, allowed the PSP to project 
legitimacy of both its crowd management efforts and crowd group intentions. Portland 
Police successfully projected legitimacy via communication from one member, whose role 
was emblematic of a PLT, with mixed results. In Charlottesville, crowd group members 
attempted to communicate with individual law enforcement officers with questions and 
concerns, but no direction was given to any officer to allow for a two-way exchange of 
information between crowd and incident leadership. 
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V. LEGITIMACY: A KEY TO REDUCED VIOLENCE 
I have only good things to say about the way we were policed, it was mostly 
in the background, mostly observing. There was no in-your-face threatening 
police action, they were very helpful, easily approachable, probably my best 
experience of police control at an England match abroad. 
 —Clifford Stott et al.309 
This final chapter presents findings from the research and conclusions on the 
application of SIT and ESIM at crowd events. The chapter recommends policy changes for 
the use of SIT and ESIM to aid in ensuring public safety during crowd events. 
A. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis set out to answer the question of how SIT can explain protester-on-
protester violence and assist with better public safety planning. This type of intergroup 
violence is unusual for American protest events. Historically, protest violence has occurred 
between law enforcement and a civilian mass protest. In more recent examples of 
intergroup violence, law enforcement has been forced to deploy a crowd management 
methodology to maintain both public safety and the right of free speech to all groups 
without showing preferential treatment to any specific protest group. 
It is essential for law enforcement to play a role in crowd management as a means 
of ensuring a vital, civil, democratic society in the United States—as law enforcement does 
in the United Kingdom and other democratic European nations. The ideal of such 
democratic governments is a constitutional way of resolving political conflicts through 
established norms and where resolution outside such norms is seen as unproductive and 
expensive.310 As discussed in Chapter II, democratic governments must provide their 
citizenry “conditions for the development of a free and lively society . . . [and] rule of law 
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to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life.”311 If 
a society cannot meet such democratic conditions, then it is inherently uncivil and may 
foster the repression of protest groups.312 The effort by law enforcement to ensure public 
safety during crowd events signifies these democratic principles of a civil society. 
Crowd control is a challenging endeavor for law enforcement. The gathering of 
crowds can be rooted in emotion, differing perspectives, and intense loyalty to an idea or 
vision, no matter the paradigm. The role of law enforcement as an impartial arbiter of free 
speech and public safety places it in the difficult position of providing an equal opportunity 
to gather peacefully. But the confluence of a wary police force and the real possibility of 
intergroup violence demands innovative thinking and new methods for ensuring peaceful 
opportunities to gather publicly.  
Soccer hooliganism is a viable proxy for comparison with protest violence. Some 
may find this a stretch and see no correlation between sporting enthusiasm and earnest 
political speech. Yet crowd psychology facilitates the search for an understanding of crowd 
behavior in either case, no matter the fundamental motivation. Researchers have long 
studied conflicts between law enforcement and protesters, but there has been little research 
within this paradigm on the protester-on-protester violence occurring with more frequency 
around the United States. American law enforcement dealing with protester-on-protester 
violence can learn from the study of crowd psychology, the intergroup dynamics of soccer 
hooliganism, and British law enforcement methodologies. 
While earlier chapters described the theoretical correlation between soccer 
hooliganism and political protest, it should also be noted that researchers in the United 
Kingdom demonstrated the applicability of SIT and ESIM within the political protest 
paradigm as well. Past studies showed that the misapplication of British crowd control 
methodologies encouraged changes in group identity within protest groups, increasing the 
probability of violence. Researchers have found this group ability to determine identity but 
also exhibit rational choice to alter it upon being influenced is evidence of ESIM at play. 
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An examination of this research demonstrates the relevance in understanding intergroup 
dynamics and the ingroup/outgroup and patron relationships among protest groups—and 
in law enforcement—that can help determine intergroup behavior. 
The applicability of SIT and ESIM to the political protest paradigm offers new 
methodologies for law enforcement. It is this translation of theory into practice that opens 
important opportunities for law enforcement to reduce intergroup violence. A graduated 
response to crowd management allows law enforcement to understand crowd groups and 
match their control efforts proactively to associated risks. This approach moves past a 
securitized response that expects a negative outcome from crowd groups or applies an 
aggressive response to all issues, no matter the gravity. Instead, scaling control efforts 
based on understood group identities creates bilateral legitimacy of both the crowd group 
identity and the measured police effort. This research found that the demonstration of 
legitimacy prevents or reduces intergroup violence within the European soccer 
hooliganism paradigm and at political protests in the United Kingdom, both in theory and 
practice.  
A component of a graduated response is the use of PLTs. This real-time method for 
communicating prevents misunderstandings while both enhancing and maintaining 
legitimization because officers serve as points of contact between individual crowd groups 
and law enforcement leadership. This proactive effort is easier than reacting to 
misunderstandings or violence to regain trust and legitimacy. Over the long term, creating 
legitimacy with law enforcement crowd-control methodologies can achieve more than safe 
crowd events. Repeated demonstrations of crowd methodologies with equal respect for 
crowd group identities, the right to gather and voice an opinion, and a graduated response 
have improved public opinion and fostered trust in local law enforcement. Tactics seen as 
overly aggressive compromise public trust in law enforcement in communities, 
necessitating a shift in policing that reestablishes public trust.  
As discussed in Chapter II, the opportunity for the citizenry to voice its opinion is 
integral to a democratic civil society. As noted earlier, Walzer finds that a civil society 
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supports all opinions without preferential treatment of one voice over another.313 Crowd 
management methodologies based in SIT and ESIM, which foster greater legitimization, 
could be the start to this process. The new variable of intergroup violence adds to the 
challenge of crowd management for law enforcement. Maintaining public safety and 
freedom of speech while neither inciting protest violence nor showing favoritism toward 
any particular protest group comes with its challenges.  
While SIT and ESIM are proven crowd psychological theories with demonstrated 
reductions in crowd violence, the theories have their detractors. Some researchers argue 
that such theories are only applicable to crowds with a rational, identifiable intent.314 For 
crowd groups who riot or are already violent, their actions are more irrational and thus may 
be less open to negotiating a safe public event.315 A reliance on crowd management 
methodologies rooted in a rationalist framework may create a tactical “blind spot” that 
leaves law enforcement unable to address irrational group dynamics.316 While this analysis 
articulates a distinction between rational and irrational crowd behaviors, it fails to 
accurately comprehend the benefit of PLTs and a graduated response in applying SIT and 
ESIM to crowd events. Through developed relationships, PLTs can provide insight into 
internal group dynamics that addresses these concerns. Any dynamics that alter a group’s 
identify or rationality can be transmitted to crowd control management so that the response 
is adjusted. Similarly, the benefit of a graduated response provides for decisive crowd-
containment efforts should crowd behaviors become irrational and jeopardize the greater 
public safety. Just because the methodology is graduated does not mean these containment 
efforts are unavailable to incapacitate crowd groups should the need arise. Critics of SIT 
and ESIM crowd management efforts are inaccurate in their descriptions of “soft policing” 
as without teeth. Their benefit is that such “hard” containment efforts are used only when 
necessary. 
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Outside influence may limit law enforcement’s successful implementation of 
crowd management methodologies based on SIT and ESIM. Law enforcement, as the 
public safety agency of local government, operates according to established policies at the 
direction of public officials. The ability of public officials to influence or alter police 
strategies may profoundly affect the successful application of SIT and ESIM principles. As 
noted in the case study of Portland’s Free Speech Rally in 2017, the actions of the special 
events sergeant from the Portland Police Bureau suggest an understanding of these modern 
crowd theories. Nevertheless, after the crowd event, media reports that questioned 
communications between the sergeant and the far-right Patriot Prayer group caused a 
significant uproar among the public and officials.317 The reaction of public officials forced 
the Portland Police Bureau to remove the sergeant in question from the position of 
overseeing crowd control, subsequently ending efforts indicative of SIT and ESIM. Only 
later was it reported that the sergeant had not shown preferential treatment to one group 
and had instead contacted both far-right and far-left groups.318 The immediate reaction by 
public officials—without a full understanding of the scope of Portland Police crowd control 
efforts—was to end communications between the police department and crowd groups, 
thereby preventing the further development of productive partnerships. Despite the intent 
of law enforcement, political influence can negatively influence law enforcement efforts 
to manage crowd events proactively. 
Further complicating the effort to address strategic crowd management efforts 
across the United States is a lack of a unifying law enforcement agency or legislative ability 
to implement or mandate local law enforcement best practices policies, such as in the 
United Kingdom. Such efforts in the United States take the form of recommendations that 
work their way either down from policy development groups or out from the successful 
initiatives of local law enforcement agencies. Examples of national policing policy groups 
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that could offer recommendations on implementing social identity theory for crowd 
management include a future presidential task force, the International Association of Police 
Chiefs, the national Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the National 
Associations of Police Organizations, or the International Association of Police Unions. 
Ultimately, these organizations have no power to mandate conformity in new crowd 
management policies, so implementation is left to local law enforcement agencies. 
Protester-on-protester violence is a new variation of protest conflict that requires 
an examination outside the more prevalent protest research to understand intergroup 
conflict. The historical conflict between protesters and police officers has given way to a 
conflict between protesters that poses a unique challenge for crowd management efforts. 
The question for law enforcement is how to maintain public safety while providing for all 
protesters the freedom of speech without appearing preferential. The answer requires a 
greater knowledge of crowd psychology and an understanding of group identity. SIT 
provides the framework for understanding group identities while ESIM offers insight into 
how crowd identity evolves based on outside influences. This new approach, based on 
social psychology research, offers a path forward to address the new crowd management 
challenges faced by law enforcement. 
Intergroup violence is too broad a human condition to be considered solvable. 
Crowd events in which opposing ideologies may lead to violence continue to occur.319 The 
threat of violence to protesters and the public remains.320 It is the responsibility of law 
enforcement, as arbiters of civil democracy, to work to lessen opportunities for violence 
while ensuring everyone his individual rights. This work should encompass any new theory 
or methodology that demonstrates opportunities to minimize intergroup violence as much 
as possible.  
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This thesis has correlated soccer hooliganism with American protest violence as a 
proxy to understand intergroup conflict. After peeling back the sport and political rhetoric 
of each paradigm, the essential elements of either are intergroup dynamics. The 
relationship between rival soccer supporter groups equates with the competing voices of 
opposing political protest groups. Applying SIT and ESIM to the soccer hooliganism 
paradigm demonstrates the relevancy of these modern crowd psychology theories in 
political protester-on-protester violence. From a position of greater insight, crowd control 
methodologies that create greater legitimacy for all protest groups minimize instances of 
violence, thereby increasing public safety. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Improvements in crowd control methodologies must come from all levels of 
government. The following are specific recommendations, based on research and analysis, 
for improving public safety using the principles of SIT and ESIM at crowd events. 
1. Seek Out a Greater Understanding of Crowd Groups 
Contrary to previous understandings of crowds rooted in classical theory, the 
application of modern crowd theory offers law enforcement invaluable insight into group 
identity. The analytical markers provided by SIT informs intergroup relations that can 
indicate both group identity and the event intent, which allow law enforcement leadership 
to evaluate groups for their potential risk to public safety. Police officers should be trained 
in SIT as a means of analysis for daily interactions with groups. Law enforcement 
intelligence units can apply SIT in ongoing research to better inform their analysis and 
recommendations for decision making. 
2. Build Flexibility into Crowd Management Methodologies 
A graduated crowd management method allows for a scaled response that 
appropriately meets the identified risk profile of crowd groups. A scalable deployment 
model of crowd control officers provides law enforcement the flexibility to address 
changing event conditions. It presents law enforcement efforts in a manner that 
demonstrates legitimacy and meets the normative expectations of civil society. 
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3. Facilitate Legitimization between Law Enforcement and Crowd 
Groups 
Implementing the concept of PLTs provides law enforcement leadership a means 
of communicating with crowd groups and may prevent misunderstandings that escalate to 
violence. Relationships that form between PLTs and crowd groups in advance of a crowd 
event can facilitate a better understanding of mutual expectations, thereby legitimizing law 
enforcement methods as well as group intent. Bilateral legitimization between groups and 
law enforcement reduces instances of violence that might arise from miscommunication. 
4. Update Federal Policy to Reflect the Use of Social Identity Theory in 
Crowd Management 
Explicit guidance and direction on the context and application of social identity 
theory would provide law enforcement agencies across the United States guidance for 
applying this modern crowd theory to their own agencies’ policies. Federal policy could 
initiate research, training, and adoption by all law enforcement agencies, thereby 
maximizing individual communities’ ability to address intergroup violence. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
American law enforcement has not understood the role SIT and ESIM can play in 
crowd management. Ideally, this thesis will initiate further research on the subject to 
facilitate its adoption. The following are some questions for future research: 
• Would adopting SIT and ESIM as an agency policy for crowd 
management create policy confliction? 
• How would SIT and ESIM and the ability to understand intergroup 
dynamics apply to other public safety agencies?  
An effective democracy is neither efficient nor easy. Addressing intergroup 
violence in any form requires attention and continual effort. Ongoing, innovative thinking 
from across disciplines can further the discussion and determine effective ways to meet our 
democratic expectations while ensuring public safety. 
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